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ABSTRACT 
 
 
JONATHAN LEE DUE.  Seizing the Initiative: The Intellectual Renaissance that 
Changed U.S. Army Doctrine, 1970-1982 
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard H. Kohn) 
 
 
A series of reforms transformed the U.S. Army’s tactical and operational doctrine between 
1970 and 1982.  These changes emerged from a confluence of events in the early 1970s that 
marked a renaissance in American military thought.  Later debates among key leaders and 
military thinkers continued to propel this intellectual revitalization that ultimately shaped the 
way that the Army would conceptualize future warfare.  Thus, it was this conceptual “re-
birth,” combined with related developments in education and training, that served as a 
turning point for the post-Vietnam American Army.  This evolutionary process produced a 
broader conceptualization of doctrine that applied not only to war-fighting, but also to 
training, education, force structure, and weapons acquisition.  Above all else, interpersonal 
dynamics, experience, leadership, and historically-inspired thought determined the fate of 
Active Defense, AirLand Battle, and the future of the Army as a whole.   
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Prologue: A Contentious Meeting and An Eagerness for Change 
 
On a stifling summer afternoon in July 1970, two young Lieutenant Colonels, Walter 
Ulmer and Danbridge “Mike” Malone, hastily conducted last minute preparations for an 
information briefing they were about to present in the Army Chief of Staff’s conference room 
in the Pentagon.  On any given day, the number of briefings and the routine, bureaucratic 
activities of the U.S. Army were countless.  Things would be different, however, during this 
briefing.  For Ulmer and Malone, the information that they were about to present would 
change several important aspects of the Army that they knew.
1
 
  General William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff, sat at the head of the 
large table.  Surrounding him were the assembled members of the Army’s high command.  
These were veterans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; warrior generals who wore 
enough stars to rival any constellation.  Ulmer and Malone, two brainy career infantry 
officers, were among the Army’s brightest, yet they carried with them no secrets of military 
strategy and no bromides of future success.  They represented the U.S. Army War College, 
an institution charged by Westmoreland four months earlier to investigate the “ethics, 
morality, and professional competence” of the U.S. Army as a whole.
2
   
As the two officers began their briefing, both Ulmer and Malone knew that the 
afternoon would be trying, for they clearly bore bad news.  Over the previous three months, 
                                                 
1
 James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the 
American Style of War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), 105-113. 
 
2
 U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 1970), i. 
2 
the War College had interviewed over 450 army officers concerning the state of 
professionalism in America’s Army.  The results indicated a widespread perception of “a 
significant difference between the ideal values and the actual values of the Officer Corps.”
3
   
Ulmer began the presentation solemnly.  Reading from the opening lines of the report’s 
abstract, Ulmer simply stated, “Gentlemen, a scenario that was repeatedly described in 
seminar sessions and narrative responses included an ambitious, transitory commander—
marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, 
fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined 
to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of 
tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.”
4
  Not surprisingly, he 
did not get very far before he was interrupted.   
“That’s not the goddamn Army that I know!” exclaimed one of the generals.  An 
extended moment of awkward silence followed the outburst.  Another general broke the 
silence, “Yeah, well, apparently that’s the goddamned trouble.  Now, why don’t you sit 
down, shut up, and let them finish.”
5
    
Finish they did, and the results of the briefing astonished all involved.  According to the 
study, the difference in the Army’s “ideal” and “operative” values resulted from “prevailing 
institutional pressures” of “self-oriented, success motivated actions, and a lack of 
professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers.”  Numbers had become an 
end in themselves.  Statistics had replaced values.  Furthermore, this “less than optimal 
climate” of institutional distrust was not the consequence of “external” factors, such as the 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., iii-v. 
 
4
 Ibid., iv. 
 
5
 Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 110.  
3 
public’s or the media’s response to Vietnam, but arose from within the leadership of the 
Army itself.  The overall professionalism of the Army, not to mention its morale, was at a 
nadir.
6
 
At the conclusion of the presentation, Westmoreland responded sadly, “I just can’t 
believe that.”  Although he chose to discuss the findings of the report that day with the group 
of assembled leaders, he later decided to designate the report as “Close Hold: For Official 
Use Only.”  Officers would be able to discuss the findings at military schools, but 
Westmoreland did not approve the release of the report to either the public or the Army as a 
whole.
7
  Despite its initial designation, however, the contents of the report soon spread via 
informal communications channels throughout the Army.   
Ulmer and Malone’s report also provided a glimpse of the emerging social climate 
within the officer corps.  At the heart of the matter laid an important truth: the U.S. Army had 
lost the war in Vietnam.  Furthermore, in the process of that defeat, the Army had lost 
something of its very essence.  Psychologically and ethically, the Army was a broken 
institution.  In addition to Ulmer and Malone’s study, a string of critical publications—some 
even written by serving officers, like William Hauser, Zeb Bradford, Jr., and Frederic 
Brown—further attested to these prevailing sentiments.
8
      
                                                 
6
 U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism, iii-v. 
 
7
 Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 112-113; Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. 
Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1983),412-
416. 
 
8
 Stuart H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America’s Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1973), 3-6, 
332-349, 360-368, and 373-386.  William L. Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military 
Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), ix-xiii, 3-8, and 189-226.  Zeb B. Bradford, 
Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 9-11, 13-17, and 233-248. 
4 
More importantly, the reports indicated that despite the troubling trends “little 
evidence” of widespread “cynicism or negativism” existed within the Army’s junior 
officers.
9
  A glimmer of hope did emerge from the pessimistic verdicts of the studies.  As 
Ulmer and Malone commented, “we were impressed by the enthusiasm these young officers 
had for a military career and they were optimistic about the future.”
10
  Bradford and Brown 
even articulated the presence of “quiet, steady progress in a number of key areas” that 
underscored that the Army, despite past problems and future challenges, was 
“unquestionably on the right course.”
11
  It was clear that the Army’s junior and mid-ranking 
officers neither fully trusted nor would blindly swallow “the party line,” but the surveys and 
their supporting analyses indicated that the officers who would ultimately lead the Army into 
the 1980s and 1990s wanted change.  More than anything, the anecdotal accounts in the 
Study on Professionalism indicated that these officers simply wanted to be heard.
12
  As the 
Study on Professionalism emphasized, “at the end of almost every seminar the officers would 
come up to us and say, ‘thank you for letting us talk to a senior officer on such a subject . . . 
This is the first time it has ever happened . . . And thanks for listening.’”
13
     
The social context of the U.S. Army officer corps was ripe to receive input and debate 
ideas that could ultimately lead to substantial change.  As a result, further studies, 
commissions, and ultimately reforms of the Army’s operational doctrine, officer education, 
                                                 
 
9
 U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism, iii. 
 
10
 Ibid., B-1-15. 
 
11
 Bradford and Brown, The United States Army in Transition, 247-248. 
 
12
 See U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism, Annex B, Appendix 1 for “Anecdotal 
Input” that numerous officers provided to the study group. 
 
13
 Ibid., B-1-14. 
5 
and training would soon emerge as the U.S. Army took stock of what the Study on Military 
Professionalism bluntly stated.
14
  
Introduction: Winning the First Battle 
 
The Study on Military Professionalism ended with a list of forty-three specific 
recommendations to correct the disturbing trends it identified.  Significantly, one of Ulmer 
and Malone’s recommendations for immediate action included the simple statement that 
“corrective action must be based on comprehensive programs.”
15
  Although few realized it, 
that simple clause was the start of a twelve-year-long process that would ultimately constitute 
one of the most comprehensive reform programs the Army experienced in a half-century. 
If the 1970s began with an official acknowledgement of the disturbing trends 
chronicled in Ulmer and Malone’s 1970 study, by 1973, several other important 
developments were emerging.
16
  In January, after antecedent negotiations conducted by 
Henry Kissinger and Henry Cabot Lodge, Secretary of State William P. Rogers signed the 
Paris Peace Accords, formally ending the American combat role in the Vietnam War.  By 
March 29, 1973, all American combat forces withdrew from Vietnam.
17
   
The year was also significant for reasons that extended beyond the cessation of 
American combat operations in Southeast Asia.  On July 1, selective service officially 
ended.
18
  Without the draft, which had existed in some form since 1940, except for one brief 
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 U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism, i. 
 
15
 U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism, i. 
 
16
 Richard Lock-Pullan effectively emphasizes this point in his excellent article, “An Inward Looking 
Time,” The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 483-512.  
 
17
 Creighton Abrams, Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972, transcribed and edited by 
Lewis Sorley (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 878. 
 
6 
eighteen-month, the U.S. Army faced a significant cultural change.  No longer could the 
Army rely on a certain number of conscripted recruits to fill its ranks.  The way it recruited 
and trained volunteers required a completely new set of practices and attitudes.  In essence, 
on the heels of a major military defeat, the Army had to re-build a new organization, the 
Modern Volunteer Army (MVA), from the “tattered remains” of a scarred institution.
19
 
On that same day, General William E. DePuy took command of the newly created 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), a sprawling institution charged with the 
education, training, and doctrinal development for the entire Army.
20
  As he assumed his new 
position, DePuy, a decorated veteran of World War II and a former division commander in 
Vietnam, made it perfectly clear what his task consisted of: “our mission is to prepare the 
Army for the next war.”
21
 
Another important event of 1973 occurred several months later and half-a-world away.  
Along the small, contentious strip of land separating the state of Israel and the Syrian Arab 
Republic, two outnumbered armored brigades of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
successfully defeated five Syrian armored and mechanized infantry divisions.
22
  Although 
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 Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 131-143.  See also Gus Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, Ending the Draft: The 
Story of the All-Volunteer Force, HumRRO Final Report 77-1 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research 
Organization, 1977) and Robert K. Griffith, Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-
1974 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1996). 
 
19
 Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 368. 
 
20
 John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical 
Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army 
Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 5. 
 
21
 General William E. DePuy to Major General Donn A. Starry, 02 July 1973, Box 3, The Donn A. Starry 
Papers, Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 
 
22
 The Israeli forces, numbering between 170-180 tanks, defeated an attacking force of over 1,500 tanks.  
See Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East (New 
York: Schocken Books, 2004), 142-169.  For a first-hand account of the level of intensity and desperation of the 
fighting on the Golan Heights, see Avigdor Kahalani, The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader’s War on the 
Golan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992). 
7 
this conflict did not involve the American military directly, it captured the attention of 
American soldiers and defense intellectuals.  The fighting underscored the nature of modern 
warfare and reinforced many of the tactical ideas developed by leading American generals 
and military thinkers.
23
  While the indecisive fighting in the Sinai Peninsula, marked by 
unsuccessful Israeli armored counterattacks, emphasized the impact of technology like anti-
tank guided missiles and surface to air missiles, the IDF’s remarkable small-unit leadership 
in the Golan Heights underscored the importance of initiative as a prerequisite for tactically 
defeating a numerically superior foe.  As a result, the war significantly influenced American 
military thinking throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
Finally, by 1973, a series of diverse institutional and intellectual changes had clearly 
emerged within the U.S. Army.  Particularly evident throughout the Army’s extensive school 
system, these developments quietly initiated a growing culture of reflective introspection.  As 
General DePuy would describe the period, it was an “inward looking time.”
24
  Furthermore, 
as these institutions promoted new ideas, a small group of leaders began to promote 
initiatives for substantial reform.  In short, a collection of critical institutions, innovative 
concepts, and visionary leaders fell into place and prepared the Army for significant change.   
At the time, few military officers or defense intellectuals fully realized that the events 
of the early 1970s, taken together, would affect the American Army so profoundly in its view 
of itself and its understanding of warfare.  Yet, the confluence of the events of the early 
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 For some, like DePuy, such ideas had roots stretching back to World War II. 
 
24
 General William E. DePuy to General Fred C. Weyand, 18 February 1976, Box 11 and 17 (duplicate), 
The William E. DePuy Papers, Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.  
Slightly different aspects of this introspection constitute the primary theme of Richard Lock-Pullan’s article, 
“An Inward Looking Time.” 
8 
1970s marked a renaissance in military thinking in the U.S. Army.
25
  This discursive process 
ultimately developed into a spirited debate over tactical and operational doctrine.
26
  In 
essence, a healthy discourse concerning how the Army should train and fight in the post-
Vietnam, “all-volunteer” era emerged.  Few eras have changed so much within a military 
organization, and the intellectual rebirth that emerged in 1970 and lasted until the mid-1980s 
produced the Army that fought two wars in the Middle East and intervened in numerous 
countries to conduct peacekeeping operations, to train foreign forces, and to combat 
terrorism.
27
   
Much has been said about this renaissance in American military thought, and several 
important works of scholarship have addressed this era of reform.
28
  Yet, one of the 
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 Contrary to many historical accounts, I argue that the post-Vietnam renaissance in American military 
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 Most of the work on this subject has been primarily biographical or autobiographical in nature.  In 
addition to the memoirs of Colin Powell, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley Clark, Frederick M. Franks, and 
Donn A. Starry, the initial journalistic inquiries of James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, Al Santoli Leading the 
Way (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals’ War 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1995) represent collective biographies that followed “a small group of courageous and 
determined people” through a dramatic time of significant change.  Several insightful historians have also 
employed an institutional approach to their analysis of these events.  These include Robert Doughty in The 
Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 
John Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982(Fort 
Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), and Paul Herbert’s Deciding What 
Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1988).  See also John P. Lovell, “Vietnam and the U.S. Army: 
9 
difficulties of this topic is that a study of any discursive process or series of debates is 
necessarily complex, if not chaotic.  Put plainly, there is no simple way to characterize this 
debate or map its structure.  Although a considerable amount of work on this subject has 
offered keen insights, as a whole, the topic’s scholarship has not provided a holistic analysis 
of the dynamic story of the Army’s doctrinal reform.
29
  Despite this, the account of how the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Learning to Cope with Failure,” in Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, ed. George K. Osborn, Asa A. Clark, 
Daniel J. Kaufman, and Douglas E. Lute (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 121-154 and Harry G. 
Summers, Jr. “The Army After Vietnam” in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History 
from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1986), 361-373 for further examples of these institutional analyses.           
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 Five main works contribute important—albeit incomplete—accounts of the Army’s post-Vietnam 
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10 
Army began its intellectual and institutional reconstruction in the years after the Vietnam 
War is an important story that needs to be told in full and demands to be understood in 
depth.
30
    
Moreover, a close examination of this process provides important institutional and 
intellectual perspectives on a significant change in American military thought.
31
  The key 
questions are many.
32
  How and why did the U.S. Army change its operational doctrine from 
1970 until 1982?  What were the key intellectual and doctrinal controversies behind this 
reform?  When did it begin?  What factors shaped the process?  How did it proceed?  How 
were these ideas expressed in action?  How did key leaders use military history to develop 
doctrinal changes?  What was the substantive nature of the resulting changes in doctrine 
during this period?  Was reform more successful in some areas than in others?  Was the 
                                                                                                                                                       
throughout this newly published work.  In addition to describing the process that started with sentiments of 
“fear and failure” resulting from defeat in Vietnam as a “success” and making the bold claim that the 
development of AirLand Battle constituted a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” Kagan places these 
developments within an important context with subsequent reforms.  Importantly, all of these accounts argue 
that the “renaissance” started with the doctrinal debates of the late-1970s (not prior to the emergence of FM 
100-5, Operations (1976) ), as well as assert that the resulting changes were “revolutionary” in nature.         
 
30
 Several important historical questions remain to be evaluated.  The topic does not necessarily need new 
information, but an understanding of the period can benefit from an introduction of new ideas and fresh 
perspectives.  As a result, I seek to shift the perspective of analysis to the years immediately preceding the 
emergence of the Army’s doctrinal debate.  Contrary to other historical and theoretical accounts, this shift in 
perspective results in a description of a different sequence of events and a different interpretation of the periods 
ultimate outcomes: a renaissance that starts earlier and is more complex and diffuse than those provided by 
previous historians; and an outcome that is evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary. 
 
31
 Despite their important contributions, no single work within the current historiography addresses the 
in-depth intellectual milieu that influenced these changes within the Army.  The topic’s important analyses 
collectively discount critical issues concerning the intellectual origins—and continuities—of important concepts 
and the decisive interaction of the story’s key institutions, individuals, and ideas.  The result is an inadequate 
description of the specific mechanisms of change.  Furthermore, much of the explanatory leverage of this story 
rests in the background: the intellectual and social milieu that created a particular historical and intellectual 
moment.   
 
32
Importantly, the questions of this study, which is part of a larger project designed to refine our 
understanding of the post-Vietnam renaissance in American military thought, education, and training—differ 
significantly from the primary research questions offered in previous analyses.  Not surprisingly, these different 
questions lead to a slightly different focus (to include a deeper inspection of the historical context in which 
several key interactions occurred) and, ultimately, different conclusions.   
11 
Army a “learning institution?”  What was the mentalité within the officer corps during this 
period?  How did this set of collective attitudes affect the reception of new ideas and their 
subsequent evolution?  What did The process provide the U.S. Army and the broader defense 
community?  What were its shortcomings?  Or, more generally, in the words of historian 
Peter Paret, “How does a military organization, without losing cohesion and effectiveness, 
change to meet the constantly recurring challenges of the new?”
33
    
Put simply, it was the intellectual renaissance in American military thought, combined 
with related developments in education and training, that served as a critical turning point for 
the post-Vietnam American Army.
34
  Moreover, the doctrinal reform that occurred within the 
Army from 1970 until 1982 grew out of a specific human context.
35
  The critical 
deliberations among military leaders and thinkers—filled with multiple points of tension and 
influenced by the personalities, intellectual predilections, and the insightful leadership of key 
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 Peter Paret, “Foreword” in To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored 
Doctrine, 1927-1938, Harold R. Winton (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988), viii. 
 
34
 To be sure, the antecedents of this process dated back to World War II and its effects stretched into the 
Reagan build-up of the 1980s.  However, the specific combination of factors and events that were both 
necessary and sufficient for change that did not coalesce until the 1970s.  Additionally, the synergy of this 
“package deal”—doctrinal reform, improved training techniques, and officer education—provides much 
explanatory leverage.  Although this essay will deal primarily with doctrinal reform, it is important to note that 
the other major works within the historiography do not examine the symbiotic nature of training, education, and 
doctrine in detail.  In addition to the identification of other historiographical lacuna identified within the notes 
of this section, a holistic analysis of the effects of this synergy is the goal of future research projects. 
 
35
 In fact, Azar Gat, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University, has argued that military thought—broadly 
defined to include theories describing the nature of war, the construction of operational doctrine, and precepts of 
professional education and training—“is not a general body of knowledge to be discovered and elaborated.”  
Instead, it is “comprised of changing conceptual frameworks which are developed in response to varying 
challenges, and which always involve interpretation, reflecting particular human perspectives, attitudes, and 
emphases.”  On one level, the restructuring of these conceptual frameworks in American military thinking can 
be found in the various field manuals and articles within the military’s professional journals.  Yet on another 
level, these frameworks—of doctrine, training, and professional pedagogy—are the result of a dialectic process 
that responded to what Gat described as the “challenges” of the international system and the “particular human” 
context of “perspectives, attitudes, and emphases” of a specific historic and intellectual moment.  This duality 
underscores that what people thought cannot be divorced from how they thought, nor can one effectively 
separate either of these questions from the circumstantial and experiential contexts in which key leaders and 
military thinkers were operating.  See Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought, From the Enlightenment to 
Clausewitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 256. 
12 
participants—shaped the way in which the Army would fight and think about its future wars.  
Considered by some to be a revolution in military affairs, the process might better be 
characterized as an evolutionary renaissance in American military thought.
36
  What emerged 
came to be labeled Active Defense, and later, AirLand Battle, and the impact on the Army in 
particular and American defense in general was enormous. 
Doctrine or Dogma: What Is Doctrine and How Has It Been Used?  
 
What is doctrine?  According to the Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, doctrine consists of “fundamental principles by which the military 
forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application.”
37
  Put another way, doctrine represents 
officially approved precepts based on experience, reflection, and study.
38
  In its simplest 
form, doctrine is what is written or what is officially taught.
39
   
                                                 
 
36
 This movement evolved in response to technological and geopolitical realities while simultaneously 
looking backwards to older models.  Accordingly, I have been purposefully deliberate in my choice of the word 
renaissance.  According to The New Oxford American Dictionary, renaissance means “a revival of or renewed 
interest in something,” or, as a proper noun, “the revival of art and literature under the influence of classical 
models in the 14th-16th centuries; the culture and style of art and architecture developed during this era.”  I 
intentionally conflate this word with its relatively conservative connotations—conservative in the sense that a 
renaissance involves reaching back to thought or forms from the past as opposed to a revolution and the creation 
of something radically different or new.  The New Oxford American Dictionary, 2d d. (2005) s.v. 
“Renaissance.”  This determination humbly offers a correction of the previous scholarship within this topic’s 
historiography.  For example, Naveh refers to the results of the doctrinal debate of the 1970s and 1980s as “a 
revolution in American military thought” and as a “quantum leap” from previous efforts, Naveh, In Pursuit of 
Military Excellence, xix-xx.  Similarly, Pullan describes this results of this reform as “a new way of war,” 
Pullan, U.S. Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, 11.  Kagan goes as far to describe the process as a 
“revolution in military affairs,” Kagan, Finding the Target, 66.  Although Citino describes this process as a 
“rebirth” and a “renaissance,” he also describes the process as having “revolutionary” consequences.  Further, 
his sequence of that renaissance (like Kagan’s, Romjue’s, Naveh’s, and Pullan’s) starts after the emergence of 
the “Great Debate” over doctrine, and not before, Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 254 and 260. 
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 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), 168.  The formulation of “fundamental principles” has been part of the official definition 
for doctrine since 1979; the clause referring to judgment in application was added in 1984.   
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 I.B. Holley, “Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?” Air 
University Review 35 (July-August 1984): 90-93.  Holley emphasized that the terms “concepts,” “doctrine,” and 
“principles” should not be used interchangeably.  According to Holley, a concept is merely an idea formulated 
13 
Although the classic works of military history and theory, namely Clausewitz’s On War 
and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War, posited theories of war and not tactical or 
operational doctrines, they remain critically important to the development and understanding 
of modern doctrine.
40
  Jomini and Clausewitz, using two very different intellectual methods, 
attempted to derive fundamental principles and abstractions concerning the nature of war.  
Significantly, both Jomini’s prescriptive principles of operational techniques and 
Clausewitz’s expansive philosophy of strategy and war have become deeply ingrained in 
American military thought.  As a result, ever since their introduction to American military 
officers and thinkers, they have played an important role in the determination of the United 
States Army’s tactical and operational doctrine.
41
  
Despite the flurry of episodic intellectual activity inspired by Jominian maxims and 
Clausewitzean dialectics, the Army’s conceptions of doctrine (officially articulated guides 
and principles) did not emerge as a major component of American military thought until the 
                                                                                                                                                       
in words; at its essence, it is “speculative, tentative, and usually malleable.”  Conversely, doctrine is what is 
taught, or officially approved “rules or procedures drawn by competent authority.”  Principles, however, “are 
truths that are evident and general;” in short, they are broader abstractions that explain the underlying ideas of 
doctrine.  See also, Holley’s influential article, “The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps,” Military 
Review (April 1979): 2-13.  See also Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, 1-2 and 
I.B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I; 
A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons. 
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971).   
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 Significantly, promulgating doctrine, as the military historian and doctrinal expert I. B. Holley has 
expressed, “involves far more than publishing a manual.”  See I.B. Holley, “Fifty Questions for Doctrine 
Writers: Means are as Important as Ends,” Airpower Journal (Fall 1997): 27-31.  Furthermore, applying the 
analysis of political scientist Barry Posen, doctrinal development involves a specific setting—in terms of 
technology, national politics and strategy, the institutional nature of the force that will employ the doctrine, and 
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consensus-building, and involved professional discussion.  See Barry Posen, in The Sources of Military 
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 7. 
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 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 133-155 and 577-578.  See also Antoine Henri Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, trans. 
Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle, Roots of Strategy Series (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 395-433 and 447-
493. 
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 John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter 
Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 184-185.   
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professionalization efforts of Elihu Root at the beginning of the twentieth century.
42
  Since 
then, American Army doctrine experienced an eclectic history of use and adaptation. 
Following the Spanish-American War, Secretary of War Elihu Root incorporated 
Emory Upton’s post-Civil War efforts to apply historical analysis in an attempt to develop 
Army doctrine as part of his “managerial revolution” that professionalized the late-nineteenth 
century officer corps.
43
   These efforts continued into the twentieth century as the emerging 
institutionalization and professionalization of the American Army intertwined history, 
strategic context, and technology as important components in the creation of military 
doctrine.
44
  In 1905, the Army published the Field Service Regulations, a small, pocket-sized 
collection of current administrative procedures and tactical principles.
45
  This document 
underwent incremental and minor revisions until 1923, when a systematic effort incorporated 
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the “lessons” of World War I tactics and operations.
46
  A similar series of revisions occurred 
during the early years of World War II, incorporating technological advances in equipment.  
The 1939 revision included a change in nomenclature introducing the title: Field Manual 
100-5.
47
   
Since that time, this manual has been the foundation of Army doctrinal literature.  Used 
primarily by officers in their education and training, it posited the “fundamental principles” 
of how the Army should fight.  Between the end of World War II and the demoralizing defeat 
in Indochina, however, both the institutional interest in this manual and in military history in 
general waned.
48
  Although elements of the Army’s tactical doctrine changed with emerging 
technology and evolving national security policy, between 1944 and 1976, there were no 
major changes to the manual.
49
  Surprisingly, the Army of 1968 was using the same basic 
outlines of the manual that the Army used in World War II.
50
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especially the case in terms of the development of conventional doctrine for mechanized forces.  As Doughty 
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Ibid., 46.  Importantly, the overriding concept of relying on America’s industrial capacity to mobilize sufficient 
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Doctrine has also played a critical role in the militaries of other countries throughout 
the twentieth century.  The effects of its development have produced dramatic 
consequences.
51
  French dedication to an ill-conceived doctrine that relied on technology and 
firepower at the expense of initiative and innovation contributed to their decisive defeat in 
May 1940.
52
  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Germany used 
doctrine as an innovative tool that produced both dramatic success, such as the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-71), Operation Michael (or Kaiserschlacht) in Spring 1918, and the 
Blitzkrieg of 1939-41, as well as total failure such as battles at Stalingrad, Kursk, the Ruhr, 
and Berlin.
53
  Likewise, the Soviet Union, despite its paranoid purges, and ironically in 
conjunction with the Reichswehr, developed a blitzkrieg-like operational concept during the 
interwar years that initiated a lengthy commitment to innovative doctrinal thinking.
54
  Not to 
be outdone, and, in fact, contributing to much of the interwar innovation, British military 
                                                                                                                                                       
resources and personnel to win the “last battle,” as opposed to “the first,” remained constant throughout this 
period until the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations. 
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thinkers such as J.F.C. Fuller and later B.H. Liddell-Hart also contributed to this rich context 
of military thought.
55
   
Institutionally, military doctrine has also played an important role in creating an 
Army’s cultural behavior: its norms, values, and practices.  This has been observed in the 
symbiotic relationship between doctrine and a professional military’s education system.  For 
example, contemporary counterinsurgency scholars have argued that doctrine is “an efficient 
way to track the development of learning in military organizations.”  They argue that 
“changes in doctrine are prima facie evidence of military learning.”
 56
  In fact, these ideas, 
expressed as “models” of “institutional learning” are quite useful for an evaluation of any 
type of doctrinal development and institutional learning, and represent an important 
component of an army’s “institutional learning cycle” (See Figure 1).
57
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Figure 1: The Process of Doctrinal Change.  This model provides a basic, although considerable 
simplified, sequence of how doctrinal changes have occurred. 
 
Such analysis provides various interpretations and demonstrations of how a military 
institution might go about doctrinal reform as it observes needs for change, orients itself to 
produce alternatives to achieve change, decides the specific course of action to produce 
change, and takes appropriate action to execute these changes.   
General DePuy, the first commander of the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), defined doctrine as the “unifying concept” that coordinated all institutional 
aspects of an army: combat operations, training, education, force structure, and leadership.
 58
  
Conceived in this expansive manner, simultaneously looking backward to history and 
forward to “future battle,” doctrine provided a military institution with an intellectual 
foundation for accomplishing its mission: a common set of principles and reference points 
that connected military activities with the goals of victory in battle.  At the same time, and 
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 William E. DePuy, Unpublished Essay, [Ca. 1989], Box 32, The William E. DePuy Papers. 
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perhaps even more important, such a conception of military doctrine provided the U.S. Army 
with an impetus—and a system—for far-reaching change.
59
  
Collecting Kindling: The Beginning of the Renaissance  
 
As the Vietnam War came to its disastrous close, the U.S. Army faced a long list of 
daunting challenges.  The American public had come to view the military with great 
antagonism and diminishing respect.
60
  As Henry Avery, a civilian aide to the Secretary of 
the Army, stated, the public did not “want to talk about Vietnam—they are tired of the body 
counts—the on and off peace negotiations—the bombings—Vietnam was to them a no-win 
nightmare to be forgotten.”
61
   
 America’s reaction to the tragedy of Vietnam had far-reaching effects.  As early as 
1969, the Nixon Doctrine reoriented the nation’s strategic focus away from Vietnam.  This 
policy, a response to both domestic political pressure as well as emerging strategic realities 
elsewhere in the world, introduced the practice of “Vietnamization” and singled out Western 
Europe “as the theater in which the [Soviet] threat was most likely.”  According to Kissinger, 
the Nixon Doctrine was an “effort to harmonize doctrine and capability.”
62
  The policy 
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20 
focused on a “1 ½  war” strategy that anticipated maintaining conventional forces for 
“simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies 
against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.”
 63
  
Accordingly, the Army focused on re-building its forces in Europe and, to a lesser extent, 
thinking about the implications of conventional warfare in the Middle East.   
The tactical situation in Europe, however, was precarious.  Because of President 
Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to mobilize the Reserves during the Vietnam War, American 
forces in Europe had been stripped for Southeast Asia, leaving those units under-manned, 
under-trained, and under-equipped.
64
  The Army faced a Soviet and Warsaw Pact opponent 
in Eastern Europe that possessed a significant numerical superiority.
65
  In 1976, NATO 
maintained twenty-seven divisions in Europe, consisting of 6,655 tanks and 800,000 soldiers, 
compared to sixty-eight divisions of 15,450 tanks and 925,000 soldiers fielded by the 
Warsaw Pact (see Table 1).
66
  What exacerbated this numerical dilemma was the fact that 
while the American Army was “away in Vietnam,” the Soviets had also “been busy . . . very, 
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(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 215-225. 
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very busy” in modernizing their forward-deployed troops in Europe with new equipment and 
increasingly sophisticated operational concepts.
67
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The quantitative disparities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Europe were quite 
daunting.  When evaluated in conjunction with qualitatively superior tactics, doctrine, and technology—
not to mention the Americans’ recent defeat in Vietnam—the Warsaw Pact’s tactical and operational 
superiority gave American military leaders much concern. 
 
In sum, General Donn A. Starry, who commanded the Army’s V Corps in Europe from 
1976 to 1977, concluded that the “battle damage” of Vietnam, especially in the American 
forces in Europe, was “extensive.”  To make matters worse, the Army suffered from an acute 
lack of discipline underscored by rampant racial tension, drug abuse, and crime in the ranks.  
At the same time, the Army was also absorbing a dramatic decrease in defense funding.  
According to Starry, the “U.S. Army was somewhere close to its nadir.”
68
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As a result of these challenges, many soldiers and officers simply did not believe that 
they could stop the communist forces from overrunning Western Europe.  Soldiers assigned 
to the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) saw themselves “as minor speed bumps” for Soviet 
forces en route to the Rhine River and Western Europe; “they did not believe they could 
defend successfully, let alone win.”
69
  Even General DePuy expressed such sentiments.  In 
1973, he bluntly stated, “if you ask me what I think about the present status of the United 
States Army when I measure it against the requirement of being twice or three times as good 
as a battalion that you might find on the other side,” a necessary requirement given the 
disparities in the number of units available to either the U.S. Army or the Soviets, “I have to 
tell you we haven’t got it.  We’re not there.  We are not anywhere near there.”
70
         
In order to overcome this atmosphere of pessimism and fear, the leaders of the nascent 
Training and Doctrine Command decided that they needed nothing less than “a revolution in 
military thought.”
71
  DePuy and Starry, among other key leaders, both recognized the need 
for this “revolution,” and actively sought the spark from which to initiate it.  As early as 
March 1972 when a Brigadier Starry, then a senior member on the Army Staff and about to 
become one of DePuy’s chief subordinates and collaborators, lamented his frustrations 
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concerning the “horrible inertia” surrounding any effort to reform the doctrinal or 
organizational aspects of the U.S. Army.  Referring to the need for this “revolution in 
military thought,” he stated that “the last such revolution,” which changed the Army’s 
national military policy from preparing a small force of “volunteers” for combat to 
supporting a national effort to “mobilize” masses of conscripts, “was over forty years in the 
making—from Emory Upton to Elihu Root and the early years of the General Staff.  We 
haven't forty years to spare now.”  Starry continued, “How do we get even a partial 
consensus at a level where we can move ahead?”
72
  Despite Starry’s frustration, however, he 
was not the only senior leader within the post-Vietnam Army who sought consensus and 
reform.   
Importantly, other leaders and previous initiatives had already begun to establish the 
foundations of the very consensus DePuy and Starry sought.  Starting in the late-1960s and 
early 1970s, guided by both William C. Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams in their 
successive tours of Army Chief of Staff, the Army’s senior leadership inaugurated a number 
of introspective studies and programs that ultimately contributed to significant doctrinal 
reforms.  These efforts, of which the 1970 Study on Military Professionalism was a part, 
established the supporting pillars of consensus needed for a renaissance, if not Starry’s call 
for a revolution, in military thought.
73
   
During the early 1970s, in addition to coming to terms with the formidable tactical 
challenges posed by the hordes of the Soviet Group Forces-Europe, the Army was 
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“unavoidably and understandably” preoccupied with “problems of morale, motivation, and 
the directly related problem of attracting and retaining volunteers.”
74
  Significantly, the 
primary thrust of these early efforts was educational and intellectual in nature as the initial 
stirrings of this “inward looking time” emerged from the three primary intellectual hubs of 
the Army: the United States Military Academy at West Point; the Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle 
Barracks.   
At West Point, two important factors emerged in the early 1970s.  First, West Point 
hosted the 1971 Department of the Army Ad Hoc Committee on the Army Need for the 
Study of Military History.  Despite its inelegant title, the committee, formed by 
Westmoreland and led by the head of West Point’s history department, Colonel Thomas E. 
Griess, explored a series of important professional questions for the entire officer corps.  
According to Dr. Brooks Kleber, at the time the historian for the U.S. Continental Army 
Command and a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, the committee underscored that “in a 
time of turmoil and transition, a major source of professionalism, stability, and integrity 
could be found in the study of military history.”
75
  The committee’s final report did more 
than reaffirm the importance of military history within the professional cannon of the U.S. 
Army, however.  The Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations prompted significant changes 
in the curricula throughout the Army’s extensive school system.  As a result, officers of all 
ranks began to receive additional education in military history.
76
  Furthermore, the Ad Hoc 
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Committee introduced a new phrase and an important professional concept into the Army’s 
lexicon: historical mindedness.
77
  The committee identified this notion as the primary 
professional value related to the study of military history and as the essential goal of its 
ambitious, Army-wide program reinvigorating the study and appreciation of military history.   
A second factor that emerged at the Military Academy involved a slightly different, yet 
no less important, facet of the academy’s faculty.  Starting in the mid-1960s, an increasing 
number of serving officers began to attend graduate school, particularly in the disciplines of 
the social sciences and the humanities.
78
  In addition to improving the scholarly credentials of 
the Academy and providing better instruction to cadets, these educational opportunities 
produced Army officers that were experienced (due to their combat service in Vietnam), 
trained at some of the top graduate schools of their respective disciplines, and professionally 
prepared to continue both learning and teaching throughout the Army’s school systems and 
in its operational units.
79
  Again, Colonel Griess, the head of the history department, as well 
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as his colleague, Colonel George A. Lincoln, head of the social sciences department, led the 
way in recruiting outstanding soldier-scholars to their faculty.  Names that would continue to 
resonate throughout the Army during the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s taught in these 
two departments in particular.
80
  Together these officers took great advantage of the 
opportunity to reflect on their collective experiences in Vietnam, their profession, and the 
nature of war.
 81
   
The early 1970s also marked a time of significant change at the Army’s Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Responding to the findings of 
Griess’s Ad Hoc Committee as well as the 1966 Department of the Army Board to Review 
Army Officer Schools (the Haines Board), the Army’s oldest and perhaps most important 
school expanded the scope of its curriculum.
82
  This resulted in an increased focus on the 
nature of teaching, which began to occur in small discussion groups highlighting case studies 
and facilitating classroom debates.  The Haines Board also affected the nature of the 
curriculum, which expanded to include an increasing number of elective courses.
83
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The arrival of Major General John H. Cushman and Brigadier General Benjamin 
Harrison in June 1973 accelerated these changes.  A diversity of new departments, teaching 
committees, and courses, such as the Applied Military History Committee and the 
accreditation of a master’s degree program (the Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) 
Program) emerged and improved the quality and depth of instruction.
84
  Significantly, these 
“turbulent” (Cushman’s phrase) changes produced an intellectual climate that would 
ultimately affect the Army’s future tactical and operational doctrine.
85
 
The findings of the Haines Board also promoted significant change in the early 1970s at 
the Army’s most senior educational facility, the Army War College.  Like Leavenworth, the 
War College’s pedagogy and curriculum underwent significant change as it offered an 
increasing number of electives.
86
  The changes at the War College, however, also included 
important institutional activities that resided outside of its classroom curriculum.  In fact, 
some of the more important changes within the War College involved the development of a 
series of introspective research initiatives, such as the Army Research Associates Program 
and the reconfiguration of its in-house think tank, the Strategic Studies Institute.
87
  The War 
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College also began the publication of a professional journal, called Parameters, started an 
oral history program that interviewed retiring senior officers, and initiated several studies and 
panels to examine the Army’s participation and ultimate failure in the war in Southeast 
Asia.
88
   
In addition to these intellectual and institutional initiatives developing at the Army’s 
primary educational institutions, important changes also occurred within the Army’s senior 
leadership.  In October 1972, Creighton Abrams succeeded William C. Westmoreland as 
Chief of Staff of the Army.  Abrams, who had previously followed Westmoreland as the 
Commander of American forces during the final years in Vietnam, quickly began assessing 
the state of the Army and its need for professionalism and inspiration in the wake of that 
conflict.  True to form (the name of his tank dating back to World War II was 
“Thunderbolt”), Abrams quickly made a significant impact on the emerging renaissance in 
American military thought through a combination of important initiatives, statements, and 
especially questions.   
One of Abrams’ primary concerns focused on the Army’s intertwined problems of 
personnel and morale.  Confronted with a significant drawdown in forces, the transition to 
the all-volunteer force, and the ethical and psychological scars of Vietnam, Abrams faced a 
formidable challenge.  Abrams’s analysis of the problem, however, went far deeper than just 
numbers of personnel or divisions available, although these were clearly pertinent issues.  He 
worried that the Army’s malaise as seen in the forces deployed throughout Europe resulted 
from a total loss of confidence in themselves, their Army, and their mission.
89
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This distressing lack of confidence had an immediate effect on Abrams.  As a result, he 
emphasized that all reforms had to keep leadership, morale, and the well-being of soldiers in 
mind.  The Chief of Staff would constantly harangue anyone within earshot that “The Army 
is not made of people; the Army is people.”  Most importantly, Abrams maintained a realistic 
perspective on taking the deliberate steps required to rebuild the Army in the post-Vietnam 
era.
90
 
Abrams’s most profound professional contributions as Chief of Staff emerged in a 
series of clear statements about leadership that were accompanied by a litany of questions, all 
designed for the Army to ponder.  Handwritten notes within the margins of staff actions and 
proposals were typical: “How does [this] action make the Army better?”  He commissioned 
research on basic questions that went to the heart of confidence and morale: “Why do we 
need an Army? . . . What kind of an Army should we have?”  Moreover, Abrams insisted that 
leaders at all levels focus on the basics by emphasizing training, readiness, and a genuine 
concern for soldiers.  In other words, Abrams perceived his mission as one focused on efforts 
to restore the Army’s confidence and even the Army’s own belief in its reason for existence.  
He constantly reminded officers that the Army must maintain “a sense of purpose and a 
dedication to that purpose.  There must be a willingness to march a little farther, to carry a 
heavier load, to step out into the dark and the unknown for the safety and well-being of 
others.”
91
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Abrams’s leadership during this critical period cannot be overstated.  Interestingly, at 
its most profound, his leadership emerged in the form of questions.  General Starry, who had 
served with Abrams throughout his career, described the Chief of Staff as an “interrogative 
commander.”  He “taught people by asking questions.  . . . He did nothing but ask questions, 
but in researching to answer his questions, you learned.”
92
  Consequently, Abrams not only 
provided leadership, but to the officers that served with him, like Starry, “he taught us, from 
beginning to end, as I long as I knew him.”
93
   
Never loquacious, Abrams’ direct manner infused a degree of confidence within the 
Army, especially among a small coterie of protégés that Abrams continually talked with and 
relied upon.  During an early 1973 meeting, prior to Starry’s assumption of command of the 
U.S. Army’s Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, Abrams stated, “We’ve got to 
reorganize,” and, in his characteristic form of question-based pedagogy, he asked Starry, 
“What would you do?”  As their discussion progressed, they talked about the need to 
stabilize personnel and manning systems throughout the force, but more importantly, they 
talked about the need to reform the manner in which the Army trained its soldiers, educated 
its officers, and created its war-fighting doctrine.  At the end of the meeting, Abrams gave 
Starry the marching orders the younger general followed for the remainder of his career: 
“What I want you to do now,” Abrams said “is get the Army off its ass.”
94
   
Abrams’s guidance and his personal example instilled a new spirit throughout the ranks 
of the Army’s senior leadership.  Even during his abbreviated tour as the Chief of Staff, 
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Abrams clearly showed the way forward as he garnered necessary political support, provided 
an example of personal leadership and energy, and fostered the intellectual stimulus for 
future change.
95
  Thus, through effective leadership and a series of critical decisions that 
placed talented officers, such as DePuy and Starry, in influential positions throughout the 
early 1970s, Abrams’s impact on future reforms were influential long after his death.    
By 1973, all these factors—critical institutions, required concepts, and necessary 
leaders—were in place.  At the same time, the institutional structures, particularly at the 
Command and General Staff College, which were necessary to facilitate an in-depth 
professional debate concerning the Army’s future doctrine, also fell into place.  Because of 
these developments and inspired leadership from Abrams and his handpicked cadre of 
leaders and protégés, the overarching climate existed for the Army to change.   
The Spark: Failure, Frustration, and The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 
 
These intellectual and institutional developments did not occur in a vacuum, however.  
In fact, the impetus of reform intersected with a pervasive acknowledgement of failure in 
Vietnam.  Defeat in Vietnam manifested itself throughout the Army’s officer corps in several 
ways.  On the one hand, the shadow of defeat exacerbated the atmosphere of pessimism and 
fear seen in Europe while accentuating the officer corps’ sentiments of frustration expressed 
in the Study on Professionalism.  Yet on the other hand, this admission encouraged the War 
College’s self-critical programs of introspection, although it did so within a certain set of 
parameters.   
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For the Army, like the public at large, Vietnam was more of a nightmare to be forgotten 
than a repository of experience from which to learn.
96
  In the early 1970s, American military 
leaders firmly believed that they could not afford another debacle like Vietnam; to them, 
neither the nation, nor their specific military institutions could weather another quagmire as 
divisive as Vietnam.  In other words, the Army was “unwilling to tear open wounds so 
recently and tentatively healed.”
97
  The phrase “No more Vietnams” became a mantra within 
the Army of the 1970s, 1980s, and even the 1990s.  As one serving officer described it, 
“After getting out of Vietnam, the Army looked around and realized it should not try to fight 
that kind of war again.”
98
       
And so defeat in Vietnam played an important, yet dual, role in sparking the American 
renaissance in military thought.  Such sentiments served not only as a catalyst for change, but 
they also shaped the direction of that change as well.  Because of this important duality 
(which was encouraged by the social, political, and strategic context of the times), as the 
renaissance developed further, it progressed in the opposite direction from directly assessing 
the lessons of Vietnam.  The Army looked to other forms of warfare that diminished, if not 
the impact of reform, at least its scope to an almost obsessive focus on the tactics and 
operations of conventional war.   
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A combination of bureaucratic frustration, an aversion to anything that smelled of 
Vietnam, and the abject fear and genuine professional concern about the Soviet threat is 
viscerally palpable when reviewing the archival evidence, oral histories, and memoirs of the 
Army’s high command throughout the early 1970s.  As Starry recalled, in addition to masses 
of Soviet conventional forces, “to the east was the threat of nuclear Armageddon—an end to 
civilization as we knew it, by means of thermonuclear warheads aboard intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.”  Instead of surrender and defeat, the real possibility of total annihilation 
existed.  Further to the east, “there appeared the equally ominous, but less well understood 
threat of the destruction of states and their peoples by the work of radical revolutionaries of 
various persuasions from political to religious.”  More importantly, “in the wake of 
Vietnam,” the American Army was “largely incapable of coping with either threat.”
99
   
These concerns resulted in a discussion among the leaders of TRADOC and General 
Abrams.  As the Army’s senior leaders expressed their apprehensions through both official 
correspondence and unofficial conversations, a clear doctrinal dilemma quickly emerged.  
Quite simply, they faced a stark choice: should the Army focus on confronting the Soviet 
conventional forces in Europe, or should the Army develop its forces to meet the challenges 
of revolutionary war?  According to Starry, Abrams “decided that the primary threat 
remained against NATO Europe; and to that we turned our undivided attention.”
100
  As with 
any choice, Abrams’s decision involved a degree of negation; the Army’s awareness of what 
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really happened in Vietnam and the process of institutional learning about its recent 
experience of irregular, guerilla warfare would have to wait.
101
 
Despite all of these important first steps, the Army’s pioneering leaders were still in 
need of a catalyst for change.  The Army required a paradigm or an event that could 
overcome the institutional pessimism and frustration that emanated from the U.S. Army’s 
defeat in Vietnam.  Throughout the Army, leaders lacked a necessary focal point on which to 
build consensus and provide a positive example of the need for, and the potential of, 
significant reform and change.   
Fortuitously, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War provided the catalyst for that consensus.
102
  
The war “vividly illustrated the lethality of modern weapons and the high value of crew 
proficiency and the skill of tactical commanders.”
103
  The nature of the fighting provided an 
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opportunity, or “a marvelous excuse,” for the U.S. Army’s own doctrinal reform.
104
  Most 
significantly, the Arab-Israeli conflict represented the antithesis to the experience of 
Vietnam.
105
  It was technologically advanced, conventional in scope, orthodox in character, 
and, at least for the Israelis, ultimately successful.   
As General Starry evaluated the situation, “the armored battlefields of the Yom Kippur 
War yielded striking lessons about what to expect in the first and succeeding battles of the 
next war.”  In full agreement with General DePuy, Starry emphasized the powerful impact of 
technologically advanced weapons systems on the battlefield.  He concluded that “the U.S. 
military should expect modern battlefields to be dense with large numbers of weapons 
systems whose lethality at extended ranges would surpass previous experience by nearly an 
order of magnitude.”
 106
  Starry’s more substantive conclusions, however, focused on more 
than just the technological aspects of warfare.  Starry came to believe that “the outcome of 
the battle at the tactical and operational levels will be decided by factors other than numbers, 
and other than who attacks and who defends. . . In the end, the side that somehow, at some 
time, somewhere during the battle seizes the initiative and holds it to the end is the side that 
wins.”  As a whole, the war and its lessons provided a realistic example that paralleled 
NATO’s challenge in Western Europe: modern technological warfare where a heavily 
outnumbered force achieved victory by relying on leadership, creative use of terrain, and 
initiative.
107
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“A Radical Departure”: The Development of Active Defense 
 
 The leaders of the United States Army wasted no time in their attempts to take 
advantage of the experience of the IDF.  Within a few weeks of the cessation of hostilities, 
Abrams dispatched Starry, then the commander of the Army’s Armor Center, to Israel to 
investigate the battlefields and “lessons” of that conflict.
108
  Starry’s report, distributed 
throughout the Army’s command structure, provided “the required framework to guide future 
Army actions and improvements.”
109
   
The short, violent, and technologically advanced nature of the war greatly affected 
leading military thinkers, both in and out of uniform.  As Starry stated:  
Historically, the United States and other western nations have assumed they could afford to lose the first 
few battles of the next war because mobilization of men and materiel in factories and military training 
centers, and mobilization of mutual support among allies would soon permit the building of an allied force 
which would overwhelm our enemies, win the last few battles, and so the war.  Today, we believe it is no 
longer realistic to depend so on a mobilization system.  For a number of reasons, it appears that we should 
expect wars of the future to be shorter and more violent than in the past.  And so, the important—essential 
task of NATO military forces is to win the first battles of the next war.
110
 
 
This paradigm shift from winning the last battle to winning the first became central to 
TRADOC’s doctrinal reform.   
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In July 1974, General DePuy attempted to make this reform a collaborative endeavor 
among the leading generals within his command.  In a letter to his subordinate commanders 
and their staffs, DePuy used a descriptive analogy to communicate his desire for a 
collaborative intellectual effort to develop the concepts and principles from which the 1976 
version of FM 100-5, Operations would eventually evolve: “In France, in the house of a 
peasant there is always a pot of soup boiling in the fireplace.  From time to time, someone 
throws in a potato, leek, some chicken stock or beef gravy, an occasional carrot or whatever.  
Over time, the soup gets better and better.  Everyone can add to it and anyone may partake.”  
As he introduced his evolving ideas concerning tactics and doctrine to his subordinates, 
DePuy continued, “I view the attached paper somewhat the same way.”
111
   
This process, with its attempts to evoke DePuy’s “pot of soup” and its efforts to 
encourage doctrinal discussion, centered on what became known as the “How to Fight” series 
of manuals.
112
  These field manuals consisted of forty-two different publications ranging 
from general tactical operations, such as armor and infantry operations, to anti-armor tactics, 
and aviation techniques and procedures.  DePuy identified the centerpiece of his reform 
efforts as the revision of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, “the capstone manual on the 
operations of the Army in the field.”
113
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Despite DePuy’s attempts of collaboration, however, the reform process remained 
relatively isolated from both the Army and the broader defense establishment.
114
  Although 
awareness of the on-going doctrinal revision was common, few officers outside of those in 
the highest levels of command knew of the actual substance of the proposed changes.
115
  
Several important factors contributed to this isolation.  First, both Abrams and his successor, 
General Frederick C. Weyand, provided extensive support to DePuy’s reform efforts.
116
  This 
support came in the form of Abram’s initial guidance—such as his gruff marching orders to 
“get the Army off its ass”—as well as limited correspondence concerning the project’s 
progress from Weyand.  More importantly, however, General Abrams’s illness and death in 
office created an “institutional vacuum” within the Army’s senior leadership that DePuy fully 
exploited.
117
  This left DePuy relatively unhindered to continue the process as he saw fit. 
Second, the limited defense spending of the mid-1970s prompted congressional 
oversight of TRADOC to focus almost exclusively on weapons systems acquisitions and 
operational costs.
118
  In fact, the documentary record indicates very few instances where 
                                                 
 
114
  For an account of DePuy’s doctrinal formulation and the creation of Active Defense, see Herbert, 
Deciding What Has to Be Done, 45-61. 
 
115
 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 104. 
 
116 General Creighton W. Abrams to General William E. DePuy, 15 August 1974, Box 27, The William 
E. DePuy Papers.  See also General William E. DePuy to General Frederick C. Weyand, 29 April 1975, 24 June 
1975, 7 October 1975, 17 December 1975, and 18 February 1976, Box 16, The William E. DePuy Papers. 
Furthermore, as General Starry points out, much of the broader post-Vietnam reforms were initiated and 
supported by Abrams.  "There was a widespread consensus that the Army needed substantial rebuilding.  That 
rebuilding began with General Abrams's appointment as Chief of Staff in the fall of 1972.  By the summer of 
1973, reorganization of the Army's command structure was underway.  That reorganization included, among 
other changes, dividing CONARC into FORSCOM and TRADOC."  Starry, “Reflections,” 548. 
 
117
 Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 364-365. 
 
118
 General William E. DePuy to General Frederick C. Weyand, 29 April 1975, Box 16, The William E. 
DePuy Papers.   
39 
Congress directly asked General DePuy a question concerning doctrine.
119
  What evidence 
that does exist suggests that DePuy’s interactions with Congress typically involved weapons 
systems acquisitions, the budget, and concerns that TRADOC’s programs be conducted in 
close coordination with the Bundeswehr and other NATO allies; all efforts that were already 
well underway.
120
     
Finally, a significant disagreement between DePuy and Major General John Cushman, 
head of the Combined Arms Center and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at 
Fort Leavenworth also contributed to the nature of the doctrinal reform.
121
  This 
disagreement, which was compounded by the fact that Leavenworth was the traditional site 
for doctrinal development, represented the first of a critical series of debates concerning the 
Army’s operational doctrine.   
The doctrinal disagreement between DePuy and Cushman originated as a matter of 
personality, experience, and perspective.  Significantly, the two officers would never 
compromise.  On the one hand, DePuy clearly saw doctrine as a tool to integrate the myriad 
activities of a complex institution and to describe how the Army should fight.  Cushman, on 
the other hand, saw the war-fighting substance of doctrine as its singular function and placed 
little significance on the doctrine’s ability to integrate various institutional activities.
122
  For 
example, DePuy defined doctrine as the “unifying concept” that coordinated all aspects of an 
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army: operations, training, education, force structure, and leadership.
123
  Conversely, 
Cushman approached doctrine as an intellectual expression of “principles and policies . . . 
developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought that can 
be defended by reason.”
124
  Moreover, in lieu of DePuy’s desire for a clear statement of 
warfighting techniques that outlined “How to Fight,” Cushman took a more philosophical 
approach to the creation of doctrine.  For Cushman, “the search for valid doctrine [was], at its 
root, a search for truth.”
125
  DePuy knew exactly what he wanted and demanded an almost 
linear order to the process.  Cushman, however, was prepared to embrace the chaos of 
creative development as a down payment for innovation.  As a result, Cushman viewed the 
doctrinal reform process as a collaborative, non-linear intellectual effort that avoided specific 
prescriptions of how to fight.
126
  When it came to doctrine, DePuy and Cushman were 
speaking different languages.
127
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41 
DePuy’s dissatisfaction with Cushman’s initial doctrinal products, known as the “A.P. 
Hill Draft” of FM 100-5, prompted the TRADOC Commander to oversee the creation of the 
new FM 100-5 personally from his headquarters at Fort Monroe.
128
  In fact, DePuy and 
Starry, along with one of DePuy’s chief assistants, Brigadier General Paul Gorman, did much 
of the conceptualization and actual writing of the manual themselves.
129
  Accordingly, the 
resulting doctrine accentuated the personal predilections of these men and greatly magnified 
their influence.   
DePuy’s formative experience of combat in World War II appeared in the new 
doctrine’s focus on small-unit tactics.
 130
  DePuy served in the 90th Infantry Division during 
World War II and witnessed extensive fighting in the “hedgerow” country during the initial 
Allied attempts to break out of the Normandy beachhead in July and August 1944.  
Inadequate leadership and insufficient training marred the division until late 1944.  As DePuy 
later remarked, “In Normandy, the 90th Division was a killing machine—of our own troops.”  
These shortcomings, contrasted to the tactical skill that DePuy witnessed “on the receiving 
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end” of the Wehrmacht, would continue to dominate his thinking for the remainder of his 
career.
131
   
Because of his experience in both World War II and Vietnam, DePuy continually 
emphasized the importance of tactical fundamentals, competent leadership, and a pervasive 
need to “focus on the basics.”
132
  His memories from fighting the Wehrmacht in Europe in 
1944 and 1945 and Vietnamese communist forces in 1966 and 1967 led DePuy to conclude 
that the Army had too little focus on the fundamental skills of soldiering in battle.
133
  As he 
emphasized in July 1973, “nobody . . . seems to be concerned . . . about the adequacy or the 
quality for the techniques and tactics of our . . . platoons, squads, crews, troops and 
companies.  Yet, this is where we are really weak, and this is where we are very, very, very 
vague.”
134
  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War merely reinforced DePuy’s career-long focus on the 
fundamental building blocks of tactical acumen and skill.
135
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43 
Intellectually, DePuy was a product of the operations research and statistical analysis-
intensive Pentagon of the 1960s.  Sometimes referred to as “the Army’s most brilliant 
general,” DePuy was a relentless perfectionist who reveled in statistics and particularly 
responded to analytical staff work that approached problems from a “systems engineering” 
perspective.
136
  These predilections would have a significant impact on the nature of the 
statistic-heavy information that populated the pages of the revised manual DePuy was 
writing. 
For his part, Starry was also affected by his own experience.  Probably Abrams’s most 
intimate protégé, Starry wrote the two main chapters of the 1976 manual (on offense and 
defense) based not on combat experience in World War II or Korea, but on his extensive duty 
in Cold War Europe, conducting counterinsurgency operations in South Korea from 1954 to 
1956, and in several significant positions in Vietnam, to include commanding the 11th 
Armored Cavalry Regiment during the invasion of Cambodia.  Starry, a true polymath, was 
also a self-taught intellectual and a bibliophile, who focused the majority of his reading on 
military history (as indicated by his personal library of over 4,000 books).
137
 
Most importantly, Starry’s interactions with the IDF throughout the early 1970s and his 
strong affinity for military history caused him to apply relevant historical analysis and recent 
military experience in the creation of the new manual.
138
  Upon returning from his initial tour 
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of the Yom Kippur battlefields, Starry, working in close collaboration with DePuy, continued 
to refine his conclusions concerning the fighting there and the nature of modern warfare.  By 
mid-1974, these ruminations evolved into a “concept paper” and a later briefing and series of 
journal articles entitled, “Modern Armor Battle.”
139
 
Based almost exclusively on his findings and reflections on the Yom Kippur War, 
“Modern Armor Battle” sought to portend “what we could expect to encounter in modern 
armor battle.”
140
  Importantly, Starry viewed its creation as the first step in an important 
dialogue “where we started trying to get people to respond to it; [to] get some kind of a 
conversation going.”  The concept paper emphasized that “long range, high velocity tank 
cannon, and long range anti-armor missile systems” would “dominate the modern 
battlefield.”  Introducing a popular phrase of the time, the concept paper clearly stated, 
“Anything they can see can be taken under fire and hit.  Anything they hit can be killed.”  
The “think-piece,” which also appeared in an expanded form as bi-monthly serial articles in 
                                                                                                                                                       
138
 Starry was quite taken with the IDF.  As he stated in a letter to Major General George S. Patton III, “if 
only we could capture the secret of motivation, devotion, determination, and all else that is so evident 
everywhere in the IDF—but I keep reminding myself it’s in the leadership, old comrade—it’s in the 
leadership.”  General Donn A. Starry to Major General George S. Patton, III, 24 July 1978, Box 13, The Donn 
A. Starry Papers.    
 
139
 Starry Interview, 05 December 2006.  Not surprisingly, as Starry described its development, “Modern 
Armor Battle” was a response to a question posited by General Abrams.  While visiting Fort Knox in early 
1974, the Chief of Staff queried Starry, “So what are you doing about doctrine?”  Starry responded by handing 
him “a paper—a concept paper—a ‘think’ paper.  It quickly became a thing called ‘Modern Armor Battle.’”  
The first archival appearance of this concept paper is in July 1974.  See Major General Donn A. Starry to 
General William E. DePuy, “Rationale for Changes in Tactics, Gunnery, ATT, ATP,” 08 July 1974, Box 3, The 
Donn A. Starry Papers.  See Also Lieutenant General Donn A. Starry, Memorandum For V Corps, Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence; “Subject: Enemy Force Densities,” 27 July 1976, Box 6, The Donn A. Starry 
Papers.  
 
140
 Major General Donn A. Starry, “Modern Armor Battle, ” January 1975, Box 36, The Donn A. Starry 
Papers.  “Modern Armor Battle” is an important conceptual development that has been overlooked within the 
topic’s historiography.  Its timing and its content demonstrate Starry’s important role in the creation of key 
ideas that ultimately became Active Defense.  This underscores a critical point: Starry’s efforts and contributions 
to the doctrinal reform process from 1973 until 1982.  Most accounts, following the dichotomous nature of the 
debate over Active Defense associate that doctrine with DePuy and its successor, AirLand Battle, with Starry.  
Available archival evidence, however emphasize otherwise, demonstrating a distinct continuity of Starry’s 
participation, and relative responsibility for both doctrines. 
45 
Armor magazine from July 1974 to July 1975, highlighted many of the concepts that would 
become critical parts of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations.  Most importantly, 
“Modern Armor Battle” succinctly summarized how Starry, along with DePuy, envisioned 
how modern combat would occur: 
The defender should attempt to destroy as many of the enemy as possible in the initial onslaught  . . . 
Timing is critical.  Cavalry and other surveillance means should be employed to detect the approach of 
succeeding echelons, allowing the defender time to reposition himself in order to meet the next attack.  
When fighting outnumbered this routine of defend, attack, then defend again, will be normal, should be 
expected, and success will accrue only to the commander who plans in detail as far in advance as possible. 
 
When compared to the vague abstractions contained within Cushman’s initial draft that was 
completed at about the same time, it is easy to discern which version of potential doctrine 
DePuy was inclined to advance.
141
   
The personal nature of the doctrine’s formulation also gave significant influence to 
other key defense intellectuals and retired senior military officers.  Three in particular stood 
out: Robert Komer, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Bruce C. Clarke.  Komer, known by many as 
“Blowtorch Bob,” was a Harvard-educated World War II veteran who later served with the 
CIA and the National Security Council.
142
  After Vietnam, where he headed the civilian 
pacification program, Komer worked for the Research and Analysis (RAND) Corporation, 
where he gave DePuy an in-depth statistical and conceptual analysis for the emerging 
doctrine.
143
  Similarly, Trevor N. Dupuy, a retired lieutenant colonel and a Harvard-educated 
military historian, also corresponded frequently with both DePuy and Starry during the 
critical period of doctrinal revision.  Of particular importance, his company, the Historical 
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Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), incorporated a stew of statistical and 
historical analysis.
144
   
Finally, DePuy and Starry received massive input from retired General Bruce C. 
Clarke.  As a young Regimental Combat Team Commander in World War II, Clarke 
commanded an outnumbered and outgunned unit that stopped the German armored 
breakthrough at St. Vith, Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.
145
  Clarke repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of maintaining a historical perspective in the evaluation of 
tactics; he also continually provided his memories of what many considered a classic 
moment of victory against the odds.
146
  Clarke’s repeated emphasis and numerous letters 
were not lost on DePuy and Starry.
147
  According to DePuy, the new doctrine “descended 
from the U.S. response in the Battle of the Bulge—the only time in the history of the Army 
when we received a massive armored breakthrough attempt.”
148
  Like DePuy and Starry, 
each of these influential figures emphasized fundamental skills and the nature of modern 
warfare.  Together, these five people, along with DePuy’s “Boathouse Gang” of doctrine 
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writers, combined experience, history, and statistics to produce a large portion of the new 
Army doctrine.   
Out of this process came the framework of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations, 
also known as Active Defense.  Much like Starry’s concept paper, “Modern Armor Battle,” 
Active Defense conceived a modern battlefield of unprecedented technological and lethal 
scope.  Supporting this assertion with numerous charts, graphs, and statistical analyses, the 
manual’s authors emphasized the increased accuracy and firepower of modern weapons 
systems.  Because of the “increased lethality” of the modern battlefield, the manual’s tactics 
emerged as being considerably different from previous versions.   
Based on the conviction that “What can be seen, can be hit; what can be hit, can be 
killed,” the specific mechanics of Active Defense resulted from the manual’s emphasis on 
concentration and the tactical strength of defensive prepared positions.
149
  At its very 
essence, Active Defense described a conventional linear battlefield in Central Europe where 
American forces would be significantly outnumbered.  The doctrine called for the U.S. Army 
to conduct a series of defensive engagements from prepared positions.  The crux of such a 
defensive operation was to pinpoint the enemy’s main point of advance and to use the lateral 
movement of unengaged forces “from less threatened flanks” to mass forces in front of the 
enemy’s main effort (See Figure 2).  As General DePuy described his doctrine, “what I am 
trying to inject into the doctrine of the U.S. Army . . . involves the concentration of 
overwhelming forces at the point of decision.”
150
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Figure 2: “The Active Defense.”  Active Defense advocated a linear defense, indicated by the line of units 
in the diagram to the left.  Once the enemy’s main attack was identified, units out of contact would 
maneuver laterally (diagram on the right) to concentrate forces in order to destroy the enemy’s attack.  
Referred to as the “thickening of the defense,” a defender would “strip out” adjacent sectors and “move 
quickly . . . to gain dominant ground.”  This defensive maneuver would continue until the enemy was 
halted.
151
   
 
In addition to these directives for tactical success, Active Defense also posited that 
offensive actions and unprotected movement would be extremely hazardous, and thus, would 
probably fail.
152
  As a result, “sweeping counterattacks” that might expose friendly forces to 
enemy fire and thus “surrender the advantages of the defender” were eschewed, although 
limited, local counterattacks that might produce “decisively greater enemy losses” were 
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encouraged.
153
  The use of tactical reserves was also discouraged as that decision might limit 
the number of forces available to mass against the enemy’s main effort.
154
 
As General DePuy explained of the doctrine’s contributing factors, Active Defense had 
many fathers.”
155
  In addition to the personal influences of its primary authors, the lethality of 
modern weapons and the nature of the Soviet threat in Europe influenced the doctrine 
greatly.
156
  The nature of modern warfare also prompted close coordination with the U.S. Air 
Force.  Working closely with General Robert J. Dixon, the commander the Air Force’s 
Tactical Air Command (TAC), DePuy incorporated the highest level of cooperation between 
the two services since 1947 into a chapter entitled “Air-Land Battle.”
157
  Additionally, the 
political and strategic necessity—voiced vociferously by the West German Bundeswehr—to 
defend Western Europe along the inter-German border also had a significant impact on 
Active Defense.
158
  Accordingly, the manual reflected “extensive collaboration with the High 
Command of the German Army” that emphasized consistency and compatibility with the 
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equivalent field manual of the German Army—100/100.”
159
  DePuy even had General 
George Blanchard, the Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR), write an entire 
chapter of the new manual dedicated to “Operations within NATO.”
160
   
 The combination of tactical fundamentals, the impact of technology on the nature of 
the modern battlefield, significant historic antecedents, and inter-service and inter-alliance 
collaboration shaped and supported the emerging doctrine.  It fit with DePuy’s cast of mind: 
mix the statistical with the historical to construct doctrinal principles and persuade skeptics.  
The resulting manual, described as a “radical departure” by one of DePuy’s deputies, 
outlined how the Army was to approach future warfare.
161
  
The First Battle Develops: The Reaction to Active Defense 
 
TRADOC leaders successfully managed the transition from theory, describing war in 
broad and vague terms, to a practical application: describing forces that would operate in a 
specific setting with specific weapons systems and capabilities.  Because of this, the manual 
differed starkly from its predecessors.  In fact, the differences with previous iterations of U.S. 
Army doctrine started with the design of its cover, which appeared for the first time with a 
camouflage pattern, (See Figure 3).  For many, the camouflage pattern was a significant, if 
subtle, attempt to signify an emphasis on the “How to Fight” mentality.  Perhaps more 
significant was the fact that the manual was not printed as a bound document.  Instead, 
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emphasizing his intention that the manual maintain a degree of realistic utility, DePuy 
insisted that the new FM 100-5, Operations (1976) exist as a loose-leaf binder. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: “How to Fight.”  The physical appearance of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 (far right) was the 
first indicator of the change wrought by the DePuy reform initiatives of 1973-1976.  The 1962 edition is to 
the left; the 1968 version is in the center. 
 
The manual also clearly highlighted its purpose, scope, and tone.  For example, the 
doctrine unequivocally stated that: 
The United States could find itself in a short, intense war—the outcome of which may be dictated by the 
results of initial combat.  This circumstance is unprecedented: we are an Army historically unprepared 
for its first battle.  We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population 
brought to bear after the onset of hostilities.  Today the U.S. Army must, above all else, prepare to win 
the first battle of the next war.   
 
With entire chapters dedicated to “U.S. Army Objectives,” “Modern Weapons on the Modern 
Battlefield,” “How to Fight,” “Air-Land Battle,” and “Operations Within NATO” the manual 
was specific and often didactic.  For example, the manual listed precise prerequisites for 
success in a battle: adequate concentration of forces and weapons; sufficient control and 
direction of the battle to maximize the effects of “fire and maneuver;” the use of cover, 
concealment, suppression, and combined arms teamwork; and maintaining a high-level of 
peacetime training to produce highly-skilled teams and crews.  The presence of numerous 
statistical charts highlighting force ratios, ranges, probabilities of success based on whether 
the defender or the attacker fired first, and the repeated need for defenders to destroy many 
52 
targets in a short period underscored the manual’s specificity (See Figure 4).  These themes 
and motifs echoed the conclusions of DePuy and Starry concerning the lethality of the 
modern battlefield and the paramount need to win the first battle.
162
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: War Made into Math: Charts such as these led to the criticisms that Active Defense maintained 
an “attrition-based” tone and that the doctrine discounted the human element of battle.
163
 
 
Many officers were receptive to the new concepts.
164
  This was particularly the case 
among the officers and staffs who contributed to the process of developing Active Defense.
165
  
As more officers began to embrace the principles outlined in FM 100-5, Operations (1976), 
by this time commonly referred to as Active Defense, it appeared that the new doctrine had 
struck a positive chord with many.   
Institutionally, TRADOC integrated the new doctrine into the training reforms that 
were going on simultaneously under the direction of Brigadier General Paul Gorman.
166
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General DePuy also incorporated the precepts of Active Defense into the Division 
Restructuring Study, which sought to redesign the organization of the Army’s fighting units 
along the same principles that propelled doctrinal reform.
167
  These collective efforts eased 
the acceptance and institutionalization of the new doctrine.  They also contributed to the 
development of a broader set of manuals for the individual branches and different combat 
and support functions of the entire operational Army.  Significantly, these manuals covered 
all aspects of the Army’s operations: fighting, training, officer education, organization, 
leadership pedagogy, and weapons acquisition.  This broader conceptualization of doctrine 
enabled TRADOC to develop a series of integrated ideas and a method of thinking that 
defined not just how the Army was to fight, but also how it was to train and educate its 
soldiers and officers.   
The acceptance of Active Defense, however, was far from universal.  In fact, many 
reacted to the new line of thinking with hostility.
168
  The resistance to the new ideas rose 
from a combination of factors: differing ideas, intellectual approaches, and assumptions 
concerning the nature of future warfare; simple misunderstandings and miscommunications; 
and institutional resistance to change.
169
  Opposition also reflected a generational tension 
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between senior officers whose formative experiences in World War II and Korea differed 
from those of a younger generation whose memories were of the agony of Vietnam.
170
   
It is not surprising that Fort Leavenworth and the Command and General Staff College 
quickly emerged as one of the primary battlefields of the developing conflict over Active 
Defense.  To be sure, some of the objections raised by the faculty and students at 
Leavenworth resulted from differing intellectual philosophies and substantive differences of 
opinion concerning doctrine.  But another clear cause of their reaction to Active Defense was 
a sense of wounded pride.
171
  In some cases, the same instructors who raised doubts about the 
new doctrine had previously served as the leading authors of the “A.P. Hill Draft” that 
ingloriously succumbed to the DePuy-Starry-Gorman formulation of Active Defense.  In 
other cases, a growing number of instructors had been “divorced” from the doctrinal 
development process and simply did not understand the nuances or the constraints that 
affected the development of Active Defense.
 172
  Thus, the faculty—many of whom had been 
educated in graduate school prior to teaching at West Point and later at Leavenworth— 
lacked an author’s familiarity with the doctrine, yet they were still armed with the academic 
skills of intellectual dissection, academic debate, and, most importantly, historical 
mindedness.
173
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At the same time, Cushman’s push in 1973 to expand the curriculum of electives and to 
provide more “small-group instruction,” with its emphasis on discussion and debate, 
naturally fostered an atmosphere of intellectual skepticism and inquiry.  The intellectual 
climate at CGSC greatly facilitated the doctrinal debate concerning the efficacy of the 1976 
manual.  Although Cushman’s approach to creating a useable doctrine was singularly 
ineffective, his broader pedagogical approach, which emphasized Socratic discussion and 
dialectic discourse, was highly effective in producing a full-fledged professional debate 
within the Army’s officer corps. 
L. Don Holder, who would later be one of the primary authors of the 1982 version of 
FM 100-5, Operations, was a major attending the Command and General Staff College as a 
student when he first encountered the new doctrine.  Like many, his reactions were mixed.  
Impressed with the manual’s tactical focus, he participated in numerous discussions 
concerning the doctrine’s ability to win, its lack of historical examples in its explanations and 
construction, and an overwhelming sentiment that based on his own historical study and 
combat experience in Vietnam that the tactics and techniques espoused in the new doctrine 
simply would not work.  Accordingly, the doctrine prompted “very spirited arguments” in 
both the “student housing area” as well as within the College’s classrooms.
174
   
Much like these initial reactions, the general critique of Active Defense focused on four 
major areas.  First, the manual placed too much emphasis on the defense.  As one CGSC 
instructor forcefully lamented,  
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The theory of the conduct of the defense in the conventional environment is so fraught with peril that its 
success requires an extraordinarily imaginative mental exercise perceiving our commanders, their staffs, 
and subordinate units to operate with an exquisitiveness of tactical judgment and a preciseness of 
execution never before achieved by large conventional forces at any point in history.  Further, the 
collapsing of available forces directly in front of the enemy raises the specter of unacceptable and easily 
exploitable risks to the flanks as well as inviting the enemy to take disproportionately costly losses—
which he can well afford—early on, to insure that this first battle is our last battle.
175
  
 
Second, its systems-analysis approach, replete with statistics and charts, neglected the 
psychological and human aspects of warfare.  As another CGSC instructor commented, “I get 
the disturbing feeling . . . that the soldier has been preempted by machines.  . . . We will lose 
for sure if we take that approach.”
176
  Additionally, this same methodology neglected 
important aspects of leadership and techniques of command and control.
177
  Finally, the 
doctrine focused too narrowly on conventional operations in Europe.
178
   
These sentiments, when coupled with the manual’s prescriptive tone, prompted an 
increasing number of objections.
179
  The general pessimistic atmosphere in the Army and an 
inherent institutional resistance to change caused further misunderstandings concerning the 
doctrine and the intent of its authors.  As Starry remarked, “there’s a loud clamor from that 
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corner of the world [mid- and junior level officers] violently opposed to what we’re 
proposing to be done with tactics . . . time and a lot of persuasive argumentation will be 
necessary to bring them along.”
180
  Nonetheless, the emerging discourse, and the general 
willingness of the Army’s leadership to engender such a debate, initiated an important 
process of clarification, adaptation, and, ultimately, synthesis.  
Fuel Added to the Fire: The Battle Continues 
 
Regardless of the degree of acceptance or disagreement, Active Defense—when 
combined with the beginnings of the renaissance in American military thought—stimulated 
an important intellectual discourse within both the Army and the broader defense 
community.  Interestingly, however, the more public aspects of the debate over doctrine were 
almost preempted before they even began. 
 On February 11, 1976, DePuy met with William S. Lind, a defense analyst and 
national security assistant for Senator Robert Taft and later Senator Gary Hart.
181
  DePuy 
arranged for members of the “Boathouse Gang,” his personal staff of doctrine writers, to give 
Lind a presentation explaining “the rationale behind the principles” of Active Defense.
182
  As 
the briefing progressed, however, it became clear that Lind was less than impressed with the 
new doctrine.  According to DePuy, Lind briefly listened to the presentation concerning the 
draft manual and then initiated “a very long lecture” on Belasarius and the history of 
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maneuver warfare.
183
  The two men parted ways with DePuy aggravated and Lind inspired to 
prepare an article criticizing Active Defense. 
In early May, Lind sought to re-open the battle.  He submitted an article, “Some 
Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army,” to the Army Office of Legislative Liaison 
with a request for comment and for publication.  In the article, Lind reported that he found 
the new doctrine “seriously deficient.”  Lind focused on several key assumptions of Active 
Defense, to include the need to win the first battle, the doctrine’s ability to describe the 
manner in which the U.S. Army would successfully fight outnumbered and win, and the 
validity of the tactics described throughout the manual.  Characterizing the doctrine as 
“attrition warfare,” he repeatedly emphasized that “there are serious questions” concerning 
the new doctrine and directly challenged whether it represented actual progress.
184
 
 When DePuy received the request, he promptly refused to either comment on or 
approve the article for publication in any of the professional journals that fell under 
TRADOC’s jurisdiction.  As he informed the Chief of the Legislative Liaison office, “I have 
no intention of getting involved in a series of non-productive, point-by-point, exchanges with 
Mr. Lind.”
185
   
Undeterred, Lind proceeded to share his article with other personnel within the Senate 
staff community as well as active duty officers.  When the staff of Military Review saw a 
copy of the article, they offered to publish it without clearing the decision with General 
DePuy.  Upon learning this, DePuy reportedly erupted, threatening to “demolish the 
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building” housing the offices of Military Review “brick by brick” if they proceeded to 
publish Lind’s critique.
186
  As a result, just as quickly as they had agreed to publish Mr. 
Lind’s article, the staff at Military Review rescinded their offer, even offering Lind fifty 
dollars for the publishing rights in order to maintain control of the manuscript.
187
 
 The situation culminated in October 1976.  Armed Forces Journal International 
published a series of four articles concerning Active Defense in that month’s edition.  Two of 
the articles provided positive feedback concerning the new doctrine.  One, conducted in the 
format of a scholarly book review, described FM 100-5, Operations as an example of 
“forward looking military thought” that existed as “a readable and useful manual.”
 188
  
General DePuy must have been pleased with such an initial response.  Yet, as he turned the 
page, he must have been reminded of the contentious meeting with Lind as he saw the results 
of their arguments and divergent perspectives aired in the most public of forums.   
The next page’s title summarized the situation: “Banned at Fort Monroe, or the Article 
the Army Doesn’t Want You to Read.”
189
  Lind, ever the proponent of maneuver warfare 
theory, used an indirect approach himself by taking his story of being denied publication in 
Military Review to the press.  The article summarized Lind’s plight and in the process leveled 
a number of allegations about both TRADOC and General DePuy.  In an attempt to maintain 
parity between the opposing points of view, the publishers of Armed Forces Journal 
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International allowed TRADOC to reply to these allegations and some of Lind’s “Doctrinal 
Questions.”   
In the series of terse responses that followed, TRADOC completed a critical first step in 
the future development of the U.S. Army’s tactical and operational doctrine.  By responding 
to Lind’s critique and his allegations, DePuy and TRADOC began what later became known 
as “The Great Debate.”
190
  To be sure, Lind deserves credit for preparing a cogent and 
“crystallizing” critique of the substantive points within the 1976 manual.
191
  Additionally, 
Lind’s dogged pursuit of the issue over publication pushed TRADOC to this critical decision.  
Likewise, however grudgingly he made the decision, and despite the obvious public and 
political pressure stemming from the allegations of suppression, DePuy still chose to engage 
in a public debate.  That decision in turn sparked further introspective thought, creativity, and 
innovation that continued the doctrinal discourse, sustained the renaissance in American 
military thought, and ultimately produced further doctrinal reform.       
The Battle Broadens: “The Great Debate” 
 
A large portion of “The Great Debate” appeared in the pages of Military Review, the 
professional journal of the U.S. Army published by the Command and General Staff College 
at Fort Leavenworth.  Significantly, from 1945 to 1976 only three articles referred to the 
topic of doctrine or FM 100-5, Operations.  After the publication of Active Defense, in July 
1976, however, the number of articles and discussions increased dramatically (see Table 
2).
192
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Table 2: The number of articles in Military Review concerning doctrine and FM 100-5 reflected the 
Army’s interest in the “Great Debate.”     
 
More important than numbers were the substance and tone of the debate.  In addition to 
the Army’s internal criticisms that focused on the doctrine’s defensive orientation and its 
diminution of the psychological and cultural elements of war, the analysis in the professional 
journals also criticized the “first battle” orientation, the lack of a tactical reserve, and the 
overemphasis on technologically advanced firepower.
193
  One of the very first articles to 
appear, Lind’s “Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army,” published in the March 
1977 edition of Military Review, was perhaps the most critical.         
 Not all the commentary in Military Review, or other defense publications, was 
negative, however.  In an early review of the new doctrine in late 1976, Philip A. Karber, a 
noted defense analyst, described FM 100-5 and its emphasis on the defense as the beginning 
of a “doctrinal renaissance” grounded in a realistic appraisal of techniques and capabilities.
194
  
                                                                                                                                                       
published during this period was eighty-five total articles per year.  The slight increase in 1981-82 reflected 
TRADOC’s efforts to preview their ideas prior to the publication of “AirLand Battle” in August 1982. 
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Additionally, Archer Jones, a renowned military historian, praised the manual for its clarity, 
its emphasis on concentration, its attention to the new technology, and its focus on defensive 
operations in a balanced analysis of the doctrine’s strengths and weaknesses.
195
   
 Nor did the commentary come just from civilians and members of the defense 
intellectual community outside of the military.  Canadian General Dan G. Loomis, after 
observing the irony of such extensive discussion about a field manual, described the doctrine 
as a “major milestone” of “tremendous strategic importance.”
196
  In July 1977, Colonels Zeb 
Bradford and Frederic Brown published “Implications of the Modern Battlefield” 
emphasizing the importance of the ongoing “revolution” about “how the Army perceives its 
combat missions.”
197
  In January 1978, Majors Robert A. Doughty and L. Don Holder used 
their collective knowledge of military history to justify, explain, and formulate “Images of 
the Future Battlefield,” while also providing readers with a prescient warning: “the adoption 
of new weaponry and doctrine which remolds or revolutionizes the nature of battle has never 
been an easy process.”
198
   
                                                                                                                                                       
194
 Philip A. Karber, “A Dynamic Doctrine for a Dynamic Defense,” Armed Forces Journal 114 (October 
1976): 28-29.  This was one of the positive articles in support of Active Defense published in the opening 
barrage of the debate in October 1976. 
 
195
 Archer Jones, “The New FM 100-5: A View From the Ivory Tower,” Military Review 58 (February 
1978): 27-36. 
 
196
 Brigadier General Dan G. Loomis, Canadian Army, “FM 100-5, Operations: A Review,” Military 
Review 57 (March 1977): 66-69. 
 
197
 Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, “Implications of the Modern Battlefield,” Military Review 57 
(July 1977): 3-11. 
 
198
 Major Robert A. Doughty and Major L. D. Holder, “Images of the Future Battlefield,” Military 
Review 58 (January 1978): 56-69.  Both of these officers served as instructors in the History Department at the 
U.S. Military Academy.  Doughty eventually received a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas, while Holder 
received a M.A. from Harvard.  MAJ Doughty would eventually serve as the Head of the History Department at 
West Point.  MAJ Holder would rise to the rank of Lieutenant General and eventually serve as Commander of 
the Combined Arms Center. 
63 
Additionally, Colonel John C. Galzay offered an insightful essay describing the 
“correlation” between writing doctrine and fighting wars.  In his May 1978 article, “On 
Writing and Fighting,” he cogently argued that “facing an enemy who is numerically superior 
and who possess a technology equal to ours means that we must properly combine men, 
materiel and intelligent tactics if we are to win.”
199
  Importantly, he emphasized that 
“doctrine must express: what usually works; what is believed by more than half of the Army 
at large; what is practiced by the Army in the field; [and] what is taught in schools;” he also 
commented that TRADOC’s process of producing and writing doctrine, along with the 
doctrine itself, must improve.
200
  Several months later, in November 1978, Military Review 
published two articles critical of Active Defense.  Both Major Michael D. Krause’s “Doctrine 
and Lessons from the Past” and Major Floyd Churchill’s “To Win the First Battle” 
questioned the basic underlying assumptions as well as the feasibility of Active Defense 
while positing alternative modifications to the body of tactical precepts contained within 
DePuy’s capstone manual.
201
   
The debate lasted for years, allowing authors to express a variety of concerns and 
critiques.  These commentaries ranged from “Doctrine and Strategy: The Misunderstood 
Basics” (1979) to “The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps” (1979) to “FM 100-5: 
Revisited: A Need for Better Foundation Concepts” (1980) to “Fight Outnumbered and 
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Win…Against What Odds?” (1980).  Even as late as 1980, the debate continued.  That year 
in particular saw a critical article authored by an irascible cavalryman that refused to pull any 
punches.  Colonel Robert Wagner, commander of the Army’s Second Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, wrote “Active Defense and All That.”
202
  Colonel Wagner’s primary thesis was 
that Active Defense ran the risk of turning into a “forward deployed, laterally dispersed, static 
operation without the linchpin of offensive maneuver to make it work.”
203
   
Largely an open and healthy professional debate, this exchange of ideas improved later 
doctrine as it played a critical role in determining the nature and substance of the 1982 
version of FM 100-5, Operations that ultimately replaced Active Defense.  Importantly, the 
debate within the pages of Military Review and other professional journals prompted 
TRADOC to respond with its own articles and clarifications.
204
  This process allowed 
officers and civilians alike to introduce innovative concepts, while simultaneously prompting 
TRADOC to improve its dissemination of doctrinal concepts and information.  Thus, 
TRADOC’s leaders, albeit hesitantly at first, provoked and participated in an insightful 
dialectic process that furthered the critical intellectual renaissance within the officer corps. 
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The Indirect Approach: The Military Reform Movement 
 
The initial critique provided by William Lind connected the development of post-
Vietnam Army doctrine with the “military reform movement.”
205
  Senator Gary Hart and 
Lind defined this “movement” as “an attempt to discover the root causes of our military 
failures, develop the ideas necessary for restoring military effectiveness, and turn those ideas 
into policy.”
206
  According to Hart and Lind, the “movement” consisted of civilian strategists 
such as John Boyd, Edward Luttwak, Steven Canby, Norman Polmar, Pierre Sprey, Franklin 
C. “Chuck” Spinney, and Jeffrey Record, as well as journalists such as James Fallows and 
members of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus.
207
  This movement advocated a 
methodology of battle and philosophy of war known as “maneuver warfare.”
208
  Contrasted 
with the notion of “attritional warfare,” where the object of conflict was the physical 
destruction of the enemy, “maneuver warfare” enthusiasts emphasized speed and movement 
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as well as the “moral, mental, and physical” aspects of war.
209
  To these theorists, warfare 
was an intellectual and psychological effort to “dislocate” and “collapse an adversary’s 
system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over and under react to activity that 
appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, and misleading.”
210
  As 
Lind elaborated, maneuver warfare “defeat[s] the enemy by disrupting his ability to react, 
rather than by physical destruction of forces.”
211
  As such, the intellectual roots of “maneuver 
warfare,” meticulously cultivated and developed by Boyd, a retired Air Force Colonel, owed 
much to the writings and thought of the British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart and his “indirect 
approach.”
212
 
Given such a philosophy, Active Defense, with its emphasis on firepower and the 
destruction of enemy forces, appeared to maneuver warfare theorists as “a continued 
adherence to the firepower/attrition doctrine.”
213
  However, the aggressive tone of Lind’s 
article, and, more importantly, DePuy’s initial reaction to it, diminished much of this group’s 
initial influence, particularly with DePuy and Starry.  Two important participants in the 
debate—the leaders of TRADOC and the maneuver warfare theorists—were talking past one 
another.  As DePuy dismissively remarked, “I was not taken with the man [Lind].”
214
  Along 
those same lines, Starry added, “No one seems to know what he is trying to prove.  He is one 
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of those instant field marshals so often found in the ranks of the Enthoven’s, Valtz’s, 
Odeen’s, and the ilk.”  Starry concluded, “I guess the best thing to do is ignore Mr. Lind.”
215
   
Although the substance of Lind’s critique was partially sound, his personal interaction 
with the leaders of TRADOC contributed to an increased level of misunderstanding.  
Ironically, this conflict of personalities forced maneuver warfare enthusiasts to use their own 
indirect approach as they chose to maintain contact with insightful mid-ranking officers, such 
as Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, as well as maintaining intellectual pressure on 
TRADOC as they continued to write articles critical of Active Defense.  Both techniques 
significantly influenced future doctrinal revisions.
216
   
Seizing the Initiative: The Development of AirLand Battle  
 
As the concepts and critiques of Active Defense spread throughout the Army, newly 
promoted Lieutenant General Donn Starry attempted to apply the principles of the new 
doctrine in Europe.  In 1976, he assumed command of the Army’s V Corps in Germany.  
Armed with numerous draft copies of the manual, Starry, who claimed he “was not 
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completely happy with what had been written,” set out to “test the ideas on the ground.”
217
  
He immediately initiated a series of “staff rides” or “terrain walks in which division, brigade, 
and battalion commanders met with me on-site [at planned defensive positions] to determine 
if the doctrine based on the Yom Kippur’s War’s lessons was about right or all wrong.”
218
  In 
very short order, Starry injected a sense of military history, personal leadership, and tactical 
acumen into his unit and applied it to the operational challenge he and his commanders faced 
on a daily basis.   
These attempts to “fit Active Defense (1976) into a real-world defensive array,” 
exposed significant shortcomings in the doctrine.  The primary problem was threefold.  First, 
the terrain walks demonstrated the degree to which many officers either did not understand or 
did not agree with the prescriptions in FM 100-5, Operations.
219
  Second, there was 
confusion over the corps commander’s specific role.  Third, there was uncertainty over what 
was to happen after the first echelon of Soviet forces was defeated.
220
  To Starry, the question 
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was quite simple: after using the tactics of Active Defense to win the first battle against the 
Soviet first echelon, “what are we going to do next?”
221
 
Active Defense did not adequately address how to deal with follow-on echelons of 
Soviet forces.  The doctrine talked at length about the first battle, but the manual offered very 
little about “how to fight” subsequent battles.  Because of this, even as the collective 
confidence of his subordinate commanders increased, eventually culminating in a belief that 
they could use the tactics of Active Defense to fight and win, Starry still faced a dilemma: 
“What am I, the corps commander, going to do—especially about the follow-on 
echelons?”
222
  It quickly became obvious to Starry and others, that Corps and Division 
commanders had much more to do than just “concentrate the forces;” in fact, with the nature 
of developing Soviet operational doctrine, these generals had important battles of their own 
to fight.   
The conclusions that Starry drew from these exercises, as he and his subordinate 
commanders began to shift the linear conceptions and lateral movements of Active Defense to 
thinking about the Soviet threat in terms of echelons and depth, significantly advanced 
American war-fighting doctrine, for Starry would soon command TRADOC and incorporate 
these experiences into future incarnations of FM 100-5.
223
  The terrain walks and their 
associated conversations prompted Starry to focus on the operational level of war: the 
techniques of “large unit operations” and the art of coordinating successive battles into an 
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overarching campaign to achieve the military goals associated with the political ends of a 
nation’s strategy.
224
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: “What are we going to do next?”  Despite its focus on meeting a technologically advanced 
Soviet adversary on the potential battlefields of Europe, Active Defense did not address the “Second 
Echelon Threat.”  As Starry attempted to apply the doctrine on the actual ground he was responsible for 
defending, he quickly focused on the question as to how best to deal with this formidable threat.
225
 
 
These issues were at the forefront of General Starry’s mind in 1977 when he assumed 
command of TRADOC.
226
  At the same time, other leaders, such as Lieutenant General 
Richard Cavazos, grew increasingly concerned that Active Defense discounted the “moral, or 
human, dimension” of warfare.
227
  Most importantly, Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, 
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the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, already named as the next Chief of Staff 
of the Army, harbored similar concerns about the substance of Active Defense as well as the 
internal and external criticism of the doctrine.
228
   
In June 1979, Meyer encouraged Starry to develop a corollary to Active Defense that 
addressed these issues.  As with so many doctrinal initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, Starry had already completed a concept paper addressing the problems identified in 
the terrain walks.
229
  Using the conclusions he developed in Europe, Starry and his staff 
created a new concept: The Central Battle.
230
   
The Central Battle posited that the Corps Commander should synchronize and 
coordinate all elements of firepower and maneuver to produce a decisive outcome.
231
  Starry 
articulated this idea as a combination of equipment and procedures that facilitated “seeing 
deep into the battlefield, moving fast to concentrate forces, suppressing enemy fires—
especially artillery—with counter-fire systems, striking quickly to kill many systems, then 
finishing the fight rapidly before the second echelon can close.”
232
  Although similar to the 
concepts of Active Defense in several important ways, Starry’s additions of “seeing deep” 
and the inclusion of a more offensive mindset represented an important series of adjustments 
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that would continue the evolution of America’s war-fighting doctrine.  Just as vital as the 
formulation of these new ideas, however, was Starry’s participation in the written dialogue 
and discourse that was continuing in the professional journals.
233
   
Starry’s previous experience in the development of the 1976 manual as well as his time 
as V Corps Commander emphasized the importance of developing a systematic approach to 
the development and dissemination of new doctrine.
234
  Upon assuming command of 
TRADOC, he took several steps to formalize the process.
235
  First, he appointed Brigadier 
General Donald R. Morelli as Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine.
236
  Second, he assembled a 
highly educated and talented team of mid-level officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) to 
form the core of a doctrine revision and writing team.
237
  This handpicked group included 
two Harvard-educated officers, Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, an advocate of 
maneuver warfare theory, and Major L. Don Holder, as well as an experienced doctrine 
writer, Lieutenant Colonel Richmond B. Henriques.
238
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Under the guidance and direct supervision of General Starry, these men reviewed and 
revised FM 100-5 starting in late 1979.
239
  As General Morelli pointed out after reviewing the 
1976 manual, “all are convinced that the manual needs a major revision.”
240
  Morelli, who 
Starry designated as the primary point of contact between TRADOC and the growing 
numbers of critics of Active Defense, came to the conclusion that, “we must answer some of 
our more knowledgeable critics—not to necessarily agree but rather set the doctrine 
straight.”
241
  Accordingly, this team captured the conceptual exchange of the “Great Debate” 
that ensued after the publication of Active Defense, as well as the development of ideas 
expressed in action by leaders such as Starry in the field.
242
   
The concepts that Starry developed on the hoods of countless jeeps in planned battle 
positions within the General Defense Plan (GDP) for Western Europe interacted with the 
debates emerging from classrooms at Fort Leavenworth as well as the ideas posited by 
military and civilian critics on the pages of Military Review, Parameters, Armed Forces 
Journal, and the Air University Review.  As a result, an interactive doctrine incrementally 
evolved.  Moreover, the process also engaged developments in Soviet operational thought 
and their actual deployments throughout Eastern Europe.
243
  This important aspect also 
                                                                                                                                                       
238
 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, 42-43.  Significantly, Wass De Czege and Holder 
had recently completed tours as instructors at West Point, further underscoring the contributions that that pillar 
of the renaissance in American military thought brought to bear within the doctrinal reform of the late-1970s. 
 
239
 Brigadier General Donald R. Morelli, Memorandum for General Starry, “Review of FM 100-5, 
Operations,” 20 February 1980, Box 20, The Donn A. Starry Papers. 
 
240
 Ibid. 
 
241
 Ibid. 
 
242
 Holder Interview, 10 November 2006. 
 
243
 Starry interview 05 December 2006; Starry, SOOHP interview.  It is instructive to note that the 
doctrinal changes pushed by Starry were reactions to both Soviet operational thought and theory and the actual 
disposition of Soviet forces on the ground in Europe.  Much of Starry’s initial conceptualization resulted from 
74 
reinforced the dialectic nature of the development of America’s war-fighting doctrine.  These 
developments also reflected the growing tendency within TRADOC to treat the enemy as a 
holistic system that could be defeated through a series of shocking blows to its will and 
coherency.
244
  Most importantly, these evolving concepts, appearing as articles and briefings, 
were not only interactive in nature, but simultaneously achieved substantive doctrinal 
revision while also assuming a key consensus-building, collaborative tone. 
Maintaining this creative momentum, Starry integrated his concept of the “Central 
Battle” with emerging conceptual developments at Fort Sill, the home of the Army’s field 
artillery center.  A small group of forward-thinking artillery officers was developing a 
sophisticated line of thought—known as Deep Attack—that targeted high-value Soviet assets 
throughout the depth of their attacking formations in order to create “windows for action” 
(See Figure 6).
245
  Thus, Central Battle, which was sometimes referred to as Deep Battle or 
the Corps Battle, became the Extended Battlefield, which incorporated these ideas emerging 
from Fort Sill and further highlighted the importance of thinking about an enemy attack of 
multiple echelons arrayed in depth.  The Extended Battlefield, in turn, slowly evolved into 
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Figure 6: Creating “Windows for Action.”  Starry continued to mix the statistics of operations research 
with the examples of military history.  Diagrams such as this example appeared in  numerous articles and 
briefings that sought to convince the U.S. Army of the need to “see deep” and “attack deep” in order to 
create windows for action, in which they might wrest control of the initiative in future battle.
246
 
 
the Integrated Battlefield, as Starry’s concepts evolved further and began to incorporate the 
conceptual use of tactical nuclear weapons and, more importantly, the systems that would 
direct the targeting of both those nuclear weapons and the Army’s long-range conventional 
assets (See Figure 7).
247
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual Progress.  The concepts of Active Defense grew into the Central Battle or the Corps 
Battle, followed by the Extended Battle, and finally by the Integrated Battle.  These ideas, originating both 
within the Army as well as from the influence of important civilian defense experts, would form the 
conceptual backbone of AirLand Battle in 1982.
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Importantly, during the entire doctrinal development process, Starry’s team of military 
thinkers maintained effective communication throughout the officer corps.  In addition to 
journal articles and briefings, Starry also directed the Department of Tactics at Fort 
Leavenworth to change the curricula throughout the Army’s school system to better reflect 
and teach the emerging concepts of the Central Battle, the Extended Battle, and the 
Integrated Battle.
 249
  As a result, by clearly communicating their developing ideas prior to 
the official publication of the doctrine, Starry and his team of doctrinal writers were able to 
ensure that the shock of something so new, felt by such a large portion of the officer corps in 
1976, would not be repeated. 
Starry also realized that the manual would have to be written at Fort Leavenworth in 
full cooperation with the Command and General Staff College.
250
  The primary job of writing 
                                                 
 
249
 See Table 1, especially the increasing number of articles as 1982 approached.  As early as 1980, at 
Starry’s instigation, the “Extended Battlefield” concept emerged as part of the CGSC curriculum meriting its 
own academic committee at the college, the “Integrated Battlefield Committee.”  LTC James Stallings, 
Department of Tactics, interview by W.G. Robertson, CAC Historical Office, 29 July 1983, Fort Leavenworth, 
transcript, Special Collections, Combined Arms Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and LTC Thomas Kelly, 
Department of Tactics, interview by W.G. Robertson, CAC Historical Office, 09 August 1983, Fort 
Leavenworth, transcript, Special Collections, Combined Arms Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  See also 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Tactical Commanders Development Course: Battle Book; 
U.S. BDE/BN Task Force (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), i-ii.  
The U.S. Army War College also introduced an entire elective course on AirLand battle, complete with its own 
text entitled, Art of War Colloquium: AirLand Battle Doctrine, by June of 1983.  U.S. Army War College, Art 
of War Colloquium: AirLand Battle Doctrine (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1983), 1-37.  See 
also the U.S. Army War College, Special Text, Academic Year 1985: Department of Military Strategy, Planning 
and Operations, Volume III: Planning (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
1984), 1-1 to 1-7.  Thus, the War College assisted in the development, evolution, and most importantly, the 
understanding of the new doctrine in several ways.  At the various branch schools throughout the Army, this 
cascading effect continued.  For example, at Fort Knox, the home of the U.S. Army Armor Center, curricular 
materials included references to both AirLand Battle as well as the developing sentiments of historical 
mindedness, as they used works of military history to highlight the principles of AirLand Battle.  See U.S. 
Army Armor Center, Combined Arms Warfare Late/Modern: Selected Readings (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army 
Armor Center, 1984, 1988), i-iii; U.S. Army Armor Center, Combined Arms Warfare Ancient/Medieval/Early 
Modern: Selected Readings (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center, 1985, 1992), i-iii; and  U.S. Army 
Armor Center, Armor in Battle (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center, 1986), i-ii.  As Starry later recalled, 
“we had to figure some way to avoid the pitfalls, the trap, that we had fallen into with the 1976 edition.”  Starry, 
SOOHP Interview, 588. 
 
77 
the new doctrine there quickly fell to Wass De Czege and Holder.  Handpicked by Starry’s 
chief deputy, Lieutenant General William Richardson, who was also the commander of Fort 
Leavenworth and the commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Wass De 
Czege and Holder each brought a unique set of credentials to this process.  Remarkably, they 
were extremely intelligent, well educated, and they had combat experience.  As a result, like 
General Starry they were both philosophical and practical.  They had the intellectual skills to 
connect with the impressive brainpower of the likes of the “military reform movement,” but 
their combat experience and military “practicality” gave them an important advantage that 
was to prove critical.  As Wass De Czege described himself and Holder, “[we] were self-
confident professionals and open-minded critical thinkers with an imagination, a standard I 
strove for and Holder achieved easily.”
251
 
Together the two officers delved into the world of military thought and theory.  Their 
sources were dense and eclectic.  For Holder, a former member of the history department 
faculty at West Point, the 1976 Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation of Clausewitz’s 
On War was particularly important.
252
  So were the German equivalent to FM 100-5, Field 
Manual 100/100 Truppen Führung, and two Soviet texts on operational warfare, 
Reznichenko’s Taktika and Siderenko’s The Offensive.
253
  Wass De Czege, a former member 
of the social sciences department faculty at West Point, also referred to these texts as well as 
Russell Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants.
254
  Writing around the clock, both officers 
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relied on the full slate of editions of FM 100-5 dating back to 1940, to include Active Defense 
as well as the numerous articles and issues expressed during the “Great Debate.”  As each 
chapter was completed, the two officers would send drafts directly to General Starry for his 
comments.
255
   
The results of this “messy process” produced the 1982 version of FM 100-5, 
Operations.
256
  This version, known as AirLand Battle, responded to the shortcomings of 
Active Defense.
257
  AirLand Battle emphasized the Central Battle/Extended Battle/Integrated 
Battle concepts: seeing and striking “deep” into the enemy’s follow-on echelons of forces 
through the Corps Commander’s efforts to synchronize offensive assets at the operational 
level of war.  As a result, it represented a direct response to the critique that Active Defense 
lacked the offensive and psychological elements of maneuver warfare theory.
258
  Portions of 
AirLand Battle went as far to refer directly to Active Defense’s controversial elements and 
offered an insightful synthesis of the opposing elements of the debate.  When describing 
“Defensive Operations,” perhaps the most contentious element of Active Defense, AirLand 
Battle stated, 
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The defense denies success to an attacking enemy.  For this reason some theorists have labeled defense the 
less decisive form of war.  To win, one must attack.  However, the distinctions between defensive and 
offensive operations of large formations are made primarily on their intended purposes rather than on the 
types of combat actions they under take.  Offensive combat is as much a part of defensive operations as 
strongpoint defenses or delaying actions.
259
 
 
AirLand Battle also moved away from Active Defense’s prescriptions of “How to 
Fight.”  In its place, the doctrine writers augmented the evolutions of Starry’s concept papers 
and briefings with a series of descriptions known as “Operational Concepts,” the “Dynamics 
of Battle,” and “Combat Imperatives.”
260
  Specifically, AirLand Battle defined its 
“Operational Concepts” as: initiative; depth; agility; and synchronization.
261
  The “Dynamics 
of Battle” consisted of “Combat Power” and “Combat Imperatives.”  In turn, “Combat 
Power” consisted of “maneuver,” “firepower,” “protection,” and “leadership.”  The manual 
also emphasized “leadership” as “the crucial element of combat power.”  Likewise, “Combat 
Imperatives” consisted of the following maxims: “insure unity of effort;” “direct friendly 
strengths against enemy weaknesses;” “designate and maintain the main effort;” “sustain the 
fight;” “move, fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly;” “use terrain and weather;” and “protect 
the force.”
262
  Moreover, the new doctrine treated the Soviet threat not as a group of numbers 
and statistics, but as a systemic whole that was to be attacked in the dimensions of both space 
and time (See Figure 8).
263
  This holistic approach, in turn, shifted the focus away from 
“servicing” a certain number of targets to “defeating”—both physically and 
psychologically—the enemy force “by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful initial 
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blows from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery.”
264
  
Despite its lists of fundamentals, principles, and imperatives, at its very essence, however, as 
Starry described the doctrine, “AirLand Battle is about taking the initiative.”
265
  Taken as a 
whole, these new ideas further emphasized the human and psychological elements of 
offensive warfare as the manual and its key concepts highlighted the operational precepts of 
initiative, depth, agility, synchronization, and leadership. 
 
Figure 8: AirLand Battle.  While emphasizing the tenets of initiative, depth, agility, synchronization, and 
leadership, AirLand Battle sought to attack the enemy in depth across the dimensions of both space and 
time.
266
   
 
In addition to these conceptual innovations, AirLand Battle also posited three integrated 
and hierarchical levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and tactical.  According to FM 100-
5, Operations (1982), the strategic level of war consisted of employing “the armed forces of 
a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of 
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force.”
267
  The operational level of war referred to the use of all “available military resources 
to attain strategic goals within a theater of war.  Most simply it is the theory of larger unit 
operations.  It also involves planning and conducting campaigns.”
268
  Finally, the tactical 
level of war described “the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and 
engagements which support operational objectives.”
269
      
The manual also illustrated “AirLand Battle Fundamentals.”
270
  A direct reference to 
the fundamental principles of maneuver warfare theorists, as well as Starry’s evolving 
understanding of the nature of modern warfare, these precepts concentrated on the use of 
both the “operational level of war” and “indirect approaches.”  The fundamentals 
underscored that speed and violence, coupled with the “flexibility and reliance on the 
initiative of junior leaders, rapid decision-making, clearly defined objectives and operational 
concepts, a clearly designated main effort, and deep attack,” could produce battlefield 
success.
271
  The emphasis on the initiative and rapid decision-making abilities of junior 
leaders was related to the German concept of auftragstaktik.  Also adopted by the maneuver 
warfare theorists, auftragstaktik referred to “a method of issuing orders so that subordinate 
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commanders are allowed maximum freedom of action to accomplish assigned missions.”
272
  
A similar emphasis also appeared with the importance of clearly designating a “main effort.”  
This, in turn, was related to another German concept that was also advocated by proponents 
of maneuver warfare: schwerpunkt or “focus of effort.”
273
  These constructs underscored 
General Starry’s conclusion that, in modern warfare, battles at the tactical and operational 
levels “will be decided by factors other than numbers and other than who attacks and who 
defends.  In the end, the side that somehow, at some time, somewhere during the battle seizes 
the initiative and holds it to the end is the side that wins.”
274
        
To be sure, the new manual and its authors did not abandon all elements of Active 
Defense.  AirLand Battle retained many of DePuy’s key assumptions, such as the lethal 
nature of modern warfare and its effects on tactics as well as the notion that the Army must 
be prepared to win the first battles in any war.
275
  Starry also maintained, and in fact 
significantly expanded, close collaboration with the Air Force.
276
  In its final form, AirLand 
Battle represented a synthesis of concepts exchanged during the “Great Debate” as well as 
the pragmatic efforts of commanders on the ground applying, testing, and re-evaluating the 
precepts of America’s emergent war-fighting doctrine.   
The key difference in the manuals resulted from the different techniques of doctrinal 
formulation.  During the first iteration of reform, the collection of information and the 
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formulation of the doctrine was relatively closed.  As opposed to the isolated process of 
1973-76, the Starry reforms incorporated the critiques stemming from the reaction to Active 
Defense and used the professional journals, concept papers, curriculum changes, and 
briefings to discuss prospective doctrinal ideas.  As Starry recalled,  
[The] thing that tied it together was that we had a briefing.  The briefing was Modern Armor Battle; the 
briefing was Central Duel; the briefing was eventually AirLand Battle.  I gave that to any audience that 
would listen and some who probably did not want to listen.  . . . There may have been ten or fifteen 
versions of that briefing. . . .  We would have an extended question and answer [session] afterward, and two 
things happened.  First a whole lot of people heard that briefing many times; more times than they probably 
would have liked to have heard it, but it was different every time.  And it was different by an amount that 
reflected something that somebody had asked about it . . . in many cases in a previous briefing.  “Wow; 
he’s listening to us.  And he has changed it because of something that we asked about.”  Now, all of a 
sudden they are shareholders in this thing.  This is theirs, it is not mine, because [I] had reacted to 
something that they asked about or commented on.
277
 
 
After 1977, Starry and TRADOC effectively used the open exchange of ideas fostered by the 
“Great Debate” to gain the necessary consensus to further doctrinal reform.  
Furthermore, where Active Defense incorporated historical lessons arising from 
statistical analysis, operations research, and the personal memories of its primary authors, 
AirLand Battle—following the influence of the Griess Commission’s call for historical 
mindedness—incorporated a more systematic use of the language and images of history (See 
Figure 9).
278
  Each major section of the manual included historical vignettes related to the 
writings of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, the French theorist Ardant du Picq, B.H. Liddell Hart, and 
even the influential British historian John Keegan.
279
  Thus, the doctrine contained in the 
1982 version of FM 100-5 offered an insightful synthesis of the technological demands of 
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modern war with the human and psychological dimensions of battle.  As a result, the 
principles of AirLand Battle have remained relatively unchanged for over a generation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Two examples of the differing uses of history.  The example on the left, from the 1976 edition of 
FM 100-5, Operations, otherwise known as Active Defense, incorporated a statistical analysis of historical 
information gleaned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  The example on the right, which was accompanied 
by a written vignette, from the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, otherwise known as AirLand Battle, 
incorporated a more traditional use and language of military history. 
 
American Military Thought: Revolution or Renaissance? 
 
In 1972, General Starry called for a “revolution in military thought.”
280
  But what was 
the outcome of the spirited doctrinal debates and military reform of the 1970s and 1980s?   
Did the Army find the “professional attainment, based on prolonged study” that Winston 
Churchill once described as “the title reeds of the commanders of future armies, and the 
secret of future victories?”
281
  Was the doctrinal reform of the 1970s and 1980s truly a 
revolution?   
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Given the dialectic progression of tactical concepts codified in Active Defense and 
subsequently in AirLand Battle, the development was not revolutionary, but evolutionary.  
Starry himself said as much in 1978 when he referred to FM 100-5 as “a tactical 
evolution.”
282
  In fact, the principles of AirLand Battle were quite traditional.  As Holder 
remarked, AirLand Battle was “really conservative doctrine,” it “retained some of the 
features of its predecessor,” as it added “some new ideas to doctrine” while returning “many 
older [ideas] to use.”
283
  At its core, the doctrine reached back to the traditions of the U.S. 
Army during World War II.  The reformers of the late-1970s and early-1980s sought to 
capture historical conclusions about the nature of conventional warfare as well as to resurrect 
the fundamental tactical and operational precepts that the U.S. Army developed during that 
conflict.
284
   
Revolution or not, the post-Vietnam renaissance in American military thought was 
significant and consisted of far more than just an interaction of ideas.  In simple terms, this 
intellectual process did not occur in a vacuum.  Numerous factors, ranging from personality 
conflicts and budgetary limitations to technological, tactical, and strategic realities, 
influenced the Army’s fundamental principles of doctrine.  To understand the context and 
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implications of this evolutionary progression of ideas, one must evaluate it in light of what it 
essentially was: the intellectual component of a consolidated effort to instill a new era of 
professionalism within the U.S. Army.  The sum of these efforts, as General Starry expressed 
in a March 1983 Military Review article, sought nothing less than “To Change an Army.”
285
 
The early 1970s presented leaders of the American Army with an opportunity for 
remarkable reform.  This was not the first time that such an opportunity arose.  To be sure, 
the efforts of Upton and Root, in the important institutional professionalization at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, emphasized the importance of military history, 
institutional education, and formal doctrine.  During the twentieth century, however, in the 
midst of the Cold War, and especially in the jungles of Vietnam, the Army and its 
professional officer corps lost its way.  The Army lost its way in terms of its doctrine, its 
intellectual roots, and its professional values and identity.  As General DePuy described the 
troubling institutional attitudes concerning training and doctrine in the 1960s: “We weren’t 
serious about it . . . we assumed that we could win any war if we just managed national 
defense right—it didn’t have anything to do with tactics, weapons, motivation, or training . . . 
It was all wrong of course.”
286
   
Defeat in Vietnam, especially when coupled with the renaissance in military thought, 
changed that.  Moreover, the doctrinal debates of the late-1970s and the on-going reform 
efforts of DePuy and Starry, supported and led by a successive string of strong Chiefs of 
Staff extended those dynamics of change.  Importantly, the efforts of these leaders interacted 
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with a particular culture and a specific environment that was eager to receive and debate 
change.  No matter how reluctant the Army’s first steps towards this debate might have been, 
what emerged might not equate to the momentous revolution that Starry called for in 1972, 
but it clearly represented the continuation of an important renaissance in military thought 
that assisted in increasing the level of professional discourse throughout the Army.  It was as 
if the kindling of the early 1970s—the critical institutions, developing concepts, and zealous 
leaders—interacted with the spark of defeat in Vietnam and the “fortuitous” example of the 
Yom Kippur War to create significant doctrinal reform.      
 At the same time that TRADOC successfully invigorated the officer corps in the 
“Great Debate,” several other important intellectual currents and initiatives were also 
emerging.  In 1979, Starry founded the Combat Studies Institute to “conduct original, 
interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the 
U.S. Army,” and to provide “an integrated, progressive program of military history 
instruction in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command service school system.”
287
  
Additionally, professional historians produced a number of important works of scholarship 
under the rubric of “new” military history.  Influential historians, such as Russell Weigley 
(The American Way of War (1973) and Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (1981)), John Keegan (The 
Face of Battle (1976)), John Shy (A People Numerous and Armed (1976)), and Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret (with their translation of Clausewitz’s On War (1976)), played an 
important role in developing the dense intellectual context that fueled this re-birth of military 
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thought.  Moreover, the growing influence of historical mindedness allowed these scholars to 
continue to interact within the doctrinal development process as well as the broader process 
of educating and training the Army’s officer corps.  This resulted in the production of 
“sound, effective, innovative techniques and programs to make history vital to the Army in 
peacetime and crucial to its winning should it be committed to battle again.”
288
 
These contributions complemented the educational spirit of the “Great Debate” and the 
intellectual flexibility, initiative, and confidence required to foster and sustain the discourse.  
This spirit had several important consequences.  First, it assisted these reforms to be 
comprehensive.  Second, it created a peculiar doctrine: AirLand Battle was a doctrine that 
was not doctrinaire.  The development of AirLand Battle represented a manner of military 
thought that emphasized creativity, qualitative military superiority, historical mindedness, 
and mental agility.  As such, the process through which TRADOC leaders developed 
AirLand Battle shaped a way of fighting and thinking about wars with a spirit and tone that 
might be best described as the Ideology of the Initiative.
289
   
This educational and doctrinal spirit provided the backbone to the extensive 
reformation of the United States Army’s tactical and operational mindset.  Even though this 
process would wax and wane throughout the turbulent history of the Army and the nation in 
the closing decades of the twentieth century, the conclusion of the process remained 
unchanged.  In many ways, Clausewitz was right.  Despite the impressiveness of technology 
or the “shock and awe” of propaganda, the nature of war remained the same . . . complex and 
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paradoxical . . . dynamic and “chameleon-like” . . . passionate and human.  Because of this, 
Churchill’s “secret of future victories,” based on “prolonged study” also remained the same.  
This was where the contributions of the diffuse beginnings of the renaissance in American 
military thought began to pay significant dividends.  In short, the doctrinal reforms that 
propelled the U.S. Army from the confidence-taxing defeat of Vietnam through Active 
Defense and ultimately to AirLand Battle required an intellectually enlightened and self-
critical organization that was open to debate, flexible to change, and versatile in its practices 
of military employment and military thought, training, and education. 
Viewed from this perspective, the influential “network” of uniformed historians and 
political scientists played a particularly important role in this process.  In fact, the early 
actions of Thomas Griess and George A. Lincoln provided the critical intellectual capital 
necessary for substantial doctrinal change.  Serving as the respective heads of the history and 
social science departments at West Point, Griess and Lincoln took advantage of the 
institutional changes occurring during the late-1960s and early-1970s to create a cadre of 
intellectual officers that not only educated cadets, but also ushered in a renaissance in 
American military thought.  As such, these two soldier-scholars served as important 
intellectual patrons that indirectly influenced the scope and nature of the Army’s doctrinal 
renaissance.  Moreover, the modern faculty system at the Military Academy, with its 
emphasis on professional development and its commitment to providing experienced and 
insightful officers with professional academic training, became the leading supplier of 
intellect throughout the officer corps.  These officers in turn became the “readers of the 
drafts, writers of articles” and active participants who provided the necessary intellectual 
90 
stimulation to initiate the debate and maintain the scholarly zeal that produced doctrinal 
reform.
290
   
For a brief time, these characteristics—the “secret of future victories”—defined the 
U.S. Army.  Over time, however, the Army’s quest for an effective doctrine, which produced 
such positive results through the 1980s, would also lead to some troubling, or at least 
ambiguous, developments.  The Army began to develop a strong bias to focus almost solely 
on the tactical level of war.  Although the doctrinal renaissance of the 1970s and 1980s 
clearly articulated what the operational level of war should look like, later training and 
educational developments (not to mention the manner in which the Army’s personnel system 
selected officers for senior command), caused the Army to continue to hone its tactical 
prowess at the expense of a deeper understanding of the operational art and a competency in 
the strategic implications of war.
291
  By the last decade of the twentieth century, the Army 
had lost much of the intellectual ardor and innovative creativity that animated a period of 
significant reform and lively debate.
292
 
Despite these subsequent shortcomings, what did occur from 1970 until 1982 was 
remarkable.  If anything about the process was revolutionary, it was how the Army’s senior 
leaders—particularly Starry—dealt with these intellectual currents in general and the 
emerging debate over Active Defense in particular.  From 1977 until 1982, surrounded by 
critics and attacked by almost all sides, Starry and his team of doctrine writers and military 
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thinkers did something remarkable; they listened.  This deceptively simple act led to a more 
inclusive synthesis that combined “lessons” of military history with a critical analysis of 
Active Defense to produce an interactive doctrine centered on the principles of flexibility, 
leadership, and above all else, initiative.  This took a special combination of intelligence, 
introspection, education, and combat experience.  The civilian reformers who offered so 
much to this innovative process had all of these attributes save one: combat experience.  
Given the specific nature of the culture of the post-Vietnam officer corps, however, it took 
the likes of Abrams, Starry, Griess, Holder, Wass De Czege, Clarke, Cavazos, and even 
DePuy, and their collective combat experience to bring these elements together. 
Taken together, these elements contributed to a broad conceptualization of the role and 
use of doctrine.  This conceptualization applied doctrine, along with extensive thought and 
reflection, not only to war-fighting, but also to training, force structure, and weapons systems 
acquisition; all of which were important aspects to rebuilding a professional organization 
within a climate of limited budgets and pessimistic sentiments.
293
  This was one of DePuy’s 
                                                 
293
 As the decade ended, the defense budgets again began to increase prior to the massive “Reagan build-
up” of the mid- to late-1980s.  Importantly, by the time the Army was able to enjoy the budgetary largesse of 
the mid-1980s, they had already established a solid, systematic intellectual foundation to support weapons 
systems procurement.  This helps to explain part of the successful acquisition and fielding of the “Big 5” 
Weapons systems: the M1 Tank, the M2/M3 Fighting Vehicle, the Patriot Air Defense Missile System, the 
Apache Attack Helicopter (AH-64), and the Blackhawk Utility Helicopter (UH-60). 
92 
most important contributions.
294
  Yet, if DePuy’s outlook concerning doctrine was broad, 
Starry’s intentions “To Change an Army” were even more ambitious.
295
   
The image on the cover of the March 1986 edition of Military Review succinctly 
summarized this important idea.  The edition portrayed the integrated elements of 
technology, training and education, field exercises, and the ubiquitous image of the American 
soldier and equipment linked together in an unbroken chain of doctrine (See Figure 10).  The 
image communicated the characteristics of an organization far different from the demoralized 
officers and soldiers left in the immediate wake of the Vietnam War.  It was nothing less than 
an image of a changed Army.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
294
 Many previous historical accounts disregard DePuy’s contributions in Active Defense as a “fiasco,” 
“stillborn,” an “absurdity,” or as a “total rejection.”  See Kagan, Finding the Target, 57 and 70; Naveh, In 
Pursuit of Military Excellence, 268.  Although Active Defense was flawed, incomplete, and lacked a broad 
consensus throughout the officer corps, these conclusions are overly harsh.  In addition to fostering the “Great 
Debate,” DePuy’s conceptions concerning doctrine remained at the forefront of Starry’s mind as he led the 
effort to create AirLand Battle.  These simple explanations and arguments—themselves a result of the 
dichotomous nature of the debate when the epithets of “attrition” and “maneuver” bandied about—mask 
important continuities about the Army’s renaissance and about the creation of AirLand Battle, to include 
Starry’s intimate participation in both versions of the Army’s operational doctrine.   
 
295
 Starry’s efforts to use doctrine “to change an army” have also been characteristically under-
emphasized in the topic’s historiography.  This is due to the pervasive emphasis—present in Naveh, Citino, 
Pullan, and Kagan—of the use of the “operational art” as a prism for analysis.  Although very important in 
identifying the key elements of AirLand Battle and how they developed, this prism distorts the fact that both 
DePuy’s and Starry’s efforts transcended descriptions and methods of how to fight.  Although creating doctrine 
that reflected their estimation of the nature of modern warfare was a central element of the reform, both efforts 
(1976 and 1982) were more than just operational conceptions.  This same oversight also diminishes the 
synergistic impact that doctrinal reform affected in a symbiotic combination with educational and training 
developments that occurred simultaneously.  Starry’s efforts in particular should be evaluated from the 
perspective that analyzes the transformative effects of the process on the culture of the Army as an institution as 
well as the transformative effects on how that institution planned to fight in battle. 
93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Conceptual Integration and Broad Conceptualization.  The cover of the March 1986 version of 
Military Review portraying the integrative and transformative aspects of a broad and inclusive doctrine. 
 
It was here where the “command influence” of Abrams, DePuy and Starry gained 
significance.  Although their conclusions discounted the experience of Vietnam as an 
aberration (a decision that would ultimately lead to an acute tactical bias with potentially 
significant costs), their influence greatly assisted the tactical and training renaissance that 
was instrumental in creating a new professional organization: the post-Vietnam “Modern 
Volunteer Army.”  The historic, professional, and human dimensions of AirLand Battle 
reflected Starry’s conclusion that “battles are won by the courage of the soldiers, the 
excellence of the leaders and the effectiveness of the training in their units before the battle 
begins.”
296
  Very much in the spirit of Clausewitz, these sentiments did much to foster a 
doctrinal system intended “to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, 
to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.”
297
  At the same 
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time, and very much in the spirit of Abrams, who Starry described as the “real genius behind 
AirLand Battle,” these sentiments helped to get the Army “off its ass.”
298
     
What this process suggests is that given the right conditions, a certain degree of 
learning and innovation was possible in the modern U.S. Army.  In fact, with the right 
conditions, the effectiveness of internal reform could be remarkable, if not near-
revolutionary.  These conditions, however, constitute a critical point in and of themselves.  
The body of archival and historical evidence indicates that doctrinal reform, at least in the 
U.S. Army, should focus on a particular threat, be feasible in its synchronization with 
national strategic policy and technology, possess a high-ranking sponsor or proponent, and be 
regenerative and collaborative in nature.  Most importantly, such reform absolutely requires 
introspective, experienced, intelligent officers that are well-educated and imbued with a deep 
sense of historical mindedness.   
Not only did the concepts within FM 100-5, Operations indicate how the American 
Army was to fight, but more importantly, the field manuals and the debate that surrounded 
them indicated how the Army was to think.  Above all else, the human dynamic of 
personality, experience, leadership, and historically inspired thought determined the fate of 
Active Defense and AirLand Battle.  This process, which would continue throughout the 
1980s, helped to create an atmosphere that would provide a significant impact on the culture, 
professionalism, and the future of the Army as a whole.   In the end, for a brief, yet critical 
time, the U.S. Army—through a combination of historical mindedness and visionary 
leadership—attained, at least when it came to conventional war, the “secret of future 
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victories.”  The task remains for current and future Army leaders of all ranks to find and 
nurture this secret once more. 
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Appendix 1: Active Defense versus AirLand Battle: A Comparison 
Defined the Principles of War.  Also defined three levels of war: 
Strategic—Operational—Tactical
“Principles of War” not mentioned; Levels of war 
indirectly addressed
Principles of War
Numerous quotes of famous theoreticians
Historical Perspectives describing each type of major operation
Offense: Grant at Vicksburg
Defense: Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg
Numerous pictures and maps graphically showing spatial 
relationships and other concepts   
Limited to the future European battlefield; Statistical 
in nature (esp. in chapter on “Modern Weapons on 
the Modern Battlefield”
Nature of 
Examples
Purpose: No change from “Active Defense”
Fundamentals of the Defense: Described as “Operational 
Concepts”
Deception
Operations Security
Maneuver
Also described “Types of Defensive Operations”
Defense
Delay
Defense of Encircled Forces
Rear Area Protection Operations
Counterattacks and Spoiling Attacks
Withdrawals
Purpose: “Cause an enemy attack to fail; Preserve 
forces, facilities, installations, activities; Retain 
tactical, strategic, or political objectives; Gain time; 
Concentrate forces elsewhere; Wear down enemy 
forces as a prelude to offensive operations; Control 
essential terrain; Force the enemy to mass so that 
he is more vulnerable to our firepower.”
Fundamentals of the Defense: “Understand the 
enemy; See the battlefield; Concentrate at the critical 
times and places; Fight as a combined arms team; 
Exploit the advantages of the defender.”
Defense
Challenges for the US Army
Combat Fundamentals
Weather and Terrain
Battlefield Environments 
Combat Service Support
Tactical Intelligence
Conduct of Operations
Fundamentals of the Offense
Offensive Operations
Fundamentals of the Defense
The Defense
Retrograde Operations
Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces
Rear Area Protection
Joint—Contingency—Combined  Operations
US Army Objectives
Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield 
How to Fight
Offense
Defense
Retrograde
Intelligence 
The Air-Land Battle 
Electronic Warfare
Tactical Nuclear Operations 
Chemical Operations
Combat Service Support
Operations within NATO
Special Environments
Chapters
Depth; Maneuver “deep” to disrupt and defeat the enemy
“Combat Fundamentals” or “AirLand Battle Fundamentals”
Initiative                           Indirect approaches
Depth                              Speed and violence
Agility                              Flexibility and Initiative of leaders
Synchronization              Rapid decision-making
Clearly defined objectives
Clearly designated main effort
Deep attack
Linear Defense; Maneuver Laterally to 
concentrate forces
“How to Fight” of “Battlefield Dynamics”
Concentration at critical times and places
Controlled and Directed Battle 
Cover, Concealment, Suppression, and 
Combined Arms
Highly trained crews and teams    
Governing 
Doctrinal Principle
Emphasized lethal “non-linear” battlefieldTechnologically advanced; rapid; lethalNature of War
Purpose: No change from “Active Defense”
Fundamentals of the Offense: Described as “Operational 
Concepts”
Concentration
Surprise
Speed
Flexibility
Audacity
Also described “Forms of Maneuver”
Frontal Attack
Penetration
Envelopment
Turning Movement
Infiltration
Purpose: “Destroy enemy forces; Secure key terrain; 
Deprive the enemy of resources, demoralize him, 
and destroy his will to continue the battle; Deceive 
and divert the enemy; Develop intelligence…By 
taking the offensive, we gain the initiative, carry the 
fight to the enemy, fight in his positions, and seek 
decision on our terms.”
Fundamentals of the Offense: “Planned around six 
basic concepts: See the battlefield; Concentrate 
overwhelming combat power; suppress enemy 
defensive fires; Shock, overwhelm and destroy the 
enemy; Attack deep into the enemy rear to destroy 
his system of defense; Provide continuous mobile 
support”
Offense
“AirLand Battle”“Active Defense”
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